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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the application of "new governance" theory and
scholarship to financial regulatory reform by examining the recent trend of
incorporating proprietary internal risk models into capital adequacy
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regulatory regimes.I In the aftermath of the subprime credit crisis, recent
academic and policy debate about the regulation and supervision2 of
financial institutions has rightly focused on potential solutions to the
manifold conflicts of interest and regulatory lacunae that exist in our
current system. While most of these proposals concern the situs and scope
of regulation, this Article contends that theoretical scrutiny of the
methodologies and tools by which financial institutions are regulated-
especially the "modes of interaction" 3 between financial firms, their
regulators, and other nonstate stakeholders-is relatively underemphasized
in financial regulation legal scholarship. In recent years, political and
socio-legal scholars have contributed to a rich new governance literature
regarding the evolving methodologies and tools of governance. By focusing
on these modes of interaction and tools as primary units of inquiry, this new
governance scholarship offers important insights into the causes and
potential remedies of regulatory dysfunction, as well as the dangers
associated with increased involvement of regulatees and other nonstate
actors in regulatory processes.
The central tenet of new governance literature posits that traditional
command-and-control, top-down regulation has been supplanted, to
varying degrees, by new forms of collaborative and polycentric governance,
often involving dynamic cooperation between the public sector (formerly
the "governors") and the private sector (formerly the "governed"), and
often characterized by an increased participation in governance by third-
party nonstate actors. These new hybrid forms of managing events in
social systems (including the financial system) have emerged in parallel with
1. Capital adequacy regimes are comprised of the legislative and regulatory rules
requiring regulated financial firms to maintain levels of capital relative to assets (with
appropriate adjustments) to foster the safety and soundness of institutions and the financial
system.
2. For an explanation of the difference between "regulation" and "supervision" in the
financial regulatory context, see generally R.M. PECCHIOLI, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN
BANKING (1987). To avoid confounding the terminology used in Parts I-V with the more
general discussion of regulation in Part V, I have adopted regulation to refer to both
supervision and regulation, recognizing that certain liberties were taken with these otherwise
distinct terms.
3. See Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 952-54
(2009), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/bclawreview/
pdP50_4/02_baer.pdf (discussing new governance in the context of deferred prosecution
agreements); Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 920 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate goal is
broader than formulating policy priorities or outlining the contours of substantive[ rules
governing the conduct of private market participants. It is equally important to identify the
most effective and efficient modes of interaction between the regulators and the regulated,
which may vary across different segments of the financial services sector.").
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the attenuation of traditional state power and the increasing complexity of
postmodern forms of life and social organization. New governance scholars
have not attempted to apply their analysis to financial regulation, and
scholars of financial regulation4 have not yet appreciated the rich insights
that new governance theory offers to their field.5
The internal models approach to capital adequacy regulation should be
considered a new governance technique because, by incorporating
regulated institutions' internal capital models in the capital adequacy
regime, it seeks to bridge intractable information asymmetries resulting
from the complexity and dynamism of contemporary financial institutions.
Despite its manifold advantages as a new governance tool in a highly
complex and dynamic regulated field, the internal models approach falls
into traps familiar to new governance reforms that render it susceptible to
literal and softer forms of agency capture, thereby compromising its
democratic legitimacy and effectiveness.
The example of the internal models approach is instructive: it represents
a new governance initiative that, while credibly seeking to accommodate
burgeoning complexity and overcome the ineffectiveness of traditional
4. There are important exceptions to this general observation. See, e.g., William H.
Simon, Optimization and Its Discontents in Regulatoy Desgn: Bank Regulation as an Example 14-17
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 9180,
2009), available at http://1sr.nellco.org/columbia-pllt/9180 (contrasting the law and
economics "optimization" perspective on regulation with a new governance, or
"managerialist," perspective that takes into account dynamic goals, such as achieving safety
and soundness in the banking sector, which require constant self-assessment and learning, as
well as consideration of complex sets of signals); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of
Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 Wisc. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 108-29 on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1525645 [hereinafter Ford, New
Governance in the Teeth ofHuman Frailty] (presenting three narratives of the subprime financial
crisis to illustrate how new governance principles might have improved financial regulation);
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 669, 729-39 (2010) (advocating for a new governance-style "dynamic model of
regulation" that recognizes that "purely top-down regulatory solutions are ill fitted to risk
management and unchanneled bottom-up solutions fall short of public goals"); Cristie L.
Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 27
(2008) (analyzing recent securities regulation reforms in British Columbia as a new
governance initiative that "requires the regulator to define broad themes, to articulate them
on a flexible and dynamic basis, to accept input from the ground level of regulated entities,
and to effectively manage varied incoming information from industry actors").
5. Much of the debate about financial regulatory technologies has revolved around
the juxtaposition of so-called "principles-based" and "rules-based" regulation. In Part
V.A.3, this Article draws on recent scholarship arguing that the principles-rules binary
distinction does little to advance our understanding of financial regulation, and argues
instead in favor of a focus on new governance.
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capital adequacy regulation, falls victim to complications that undermine its
regulatory objective. Capital adequacy regulation aims to minimize social
costs associated with financial institution insolvencies. It achieves that goal
by fostering a loss buffer with reasonable confidence and imposing a risk tax
in the form of a capital charge for riskier business lines. A premise of this
Article is that since at least the early 1970s, when major powers jettisoned
the Bretton Woods financial system, the global financial system has been
positioned in a complexity paradigm in which innovation, competition,
globalization, technology, and consolidation operate, sometimes
interactively, to ratchet up the system's complexity. This process
accelerated in the 1990s as advances in theoretical finance and computer
technologies combined to create a "new financial code"6 embodied in
value-at-risk (VaR) and economic capital models. Since the effectiveness of
capital adequacy regulation depends on the ability to secure a loss buffer
and impose a risk tax, this complexity paradigm, which entails a dynamic
and proliferating risk profile, presents a structural dilemma for regulators.
In response to this dilemma, in recent years financial regulators have sought
to incorporate the new financial code (in the form of internal models) into
capital adequacy regimes as a means of bridging the informational chasm
between the actual risk profile of regulated firms and the regulators charged
with minimizing the social costs incurred if those risks materialize.
My hope is that this Article, by analyzing a financial regulatory
technology as a response to complexity from a new governance perspective,
will prompt a deeper appreciation for new governance theory within
financial regulation scholarship. New governance theory offers notable
insights into the regulation of social systems dominated by complexity and
dynamism, as with the contemporary financial system. By analyzing the
complex financial system according to a new governance framework,
scholars and policymakers will likely be able to (1) improve their diagnosis
of sources of regulatory dysfunction, including those in connection with the
recent subprime credit crisis; (2) propose reforms that will better conduce
the public goals of financial regulation; and (3) deepen their understanding
of the normative challenges to democratic legitimacy that are implicated
when regulators seek to govern complexity through increased involvement
of nonstate actors in the regulatory process. Future new governance
inquiries into financial regulatory reform must focus on this legitimacy
challenge and safeguard against the possibility that in the rush to bridge
information asymmetries inherent in complex markets, policymakers might
6. 1 owe this phrase to Erik Gerding. See generally Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open
Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84
WASH. L. REv. 127 (2009).
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adopt a reform that creates more problems than it solves. This Article
argues that this possibility materialized when financial regulators adopted
the internal models approach. Sometimes, new governance theory will
demonstrate how regulatory tools may be deployed to regulate complexity
and dynamism more effectively; at other times, it will elucidate flaws with
those tools. Because new governance theory focuses attention on these
problems, it must remain open to a critique of complexity itself.
Part I explains the critical public regulatory role of capital adequacy
regulation. Part II.A summarizes the genealogy of capital adequacy
regulation for banks. Part II.B discusses the formation of the Basel
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Basel
Committee) as the international bank regulatory policy coordinator and its
three central achievements: the initial Basel Accord of 1988, the substantial
market risk amendments of 1996 (later amended in 2005), and Basel II.
This Part also traces how the Basel Committee adopted internal models
approaches as a means of more closely calibrating capital requirements to
the actual risk profiles of regulated banks, which had become increasingly
complex in the 1990s, in large part due to the development of a new
financial code, including risk modeling technologies. Parts III and IV,
briefly address how the ascendancy of this "Basel Brand" of regulation led
to the Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Consolidated Supervised
Entities (CSE) Program for broker-dealers and the European Union's
(E.U.'s) proposed Solvency II regime for insurance companies.
Part V provides an overview of new governance theory and situates the
use of internal models by financial regulators within the new governance
literature. In particular, the discussion focuses on three attributes of new
governance tools that are relevant to the internal models approach:
increased participation by nonstate stakeholders, the retention by public
regulators of a "benign big gun," and dynamic and flexible lawmaking. In
the process, the Article describes certain normative challenges posed by
new governance initiatives. Finally, the Article (1) explains why the internal
approach to capital adequacy regulation should be considered a new
governance initiative; (2) shows how it poses normative problems typical of
new governance initiatives that threaten its democratic legitimacy, expose it
to risks of literal and soft capture, and ultimately undermine its
effectiveness; and (3) evaluates its mandatory disclosure regime as a
promising, but incomplete, solution to the central challenge to legitimacy.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
This Part explains the role of financial institutions, their inherent
instability, and the role of capital adequacy regulation in achieving the
788 [62:3
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policy goals of consumer protection and systemic stability. Regulators
require that regulated financial institutions maintain capital at specified
levels. Regulators impose these capital requirements to ensure that firms
have an available "cushion" or buffer to absorb unexpected losses without
threatening the ability of the institution to satisfy claims of depositors (in the
case of banks), insurance policyholders (in the case of insurers), or clients (in
the case of broker-dealers), or the systemic integrity of the financial system.
In its simplest form, the capital requirement consists of a minimum ratio of
capital-defined to include equity (assets minus liabilities) and in some cases
other add-ons thought to possess equity-like features, such as subordinated
debt-to assets. Thus, as a firm's equity declines, so does its capital ratio,
which may result in noncompliance with the capital adequacy regime and a
need to raise new capital.
Financial systems perform essential functions in a market economy, such
as transforming savings into productive capital, providing information
about users of capital, performing capital allocation functions, providing
payment and funds transfer services, reducing agency costs by overseeing
management, and efficiently spreading and pooling risk through derivatives
and securitization. Finance is "the oil that lubricates the wheels of
commerce." 7 These ends of finance can be frustrated by exogenous factors
and even by the financial system's internal operation.8  Financial
institutions may also be controlled by rent-seeking constituencies, as
evidenced recently when investment bank personnel "earned" tens of
millions of dollars of income for their roles in securitizing collateral pools of
subprime mortgages.9 While the optimal prevalence and complexity of the
financial sector in a market economy is a matter very much up for debate,10
7. BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST? INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND
AMERicAN FOREIGN PoLicY 299 (1986).
8. See generally Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporay Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505 (1998).
9. Cf Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation 2 (Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1319648 (addressing
the perception that the 2007-2008 financial woes stemmed from managers taking excessive
risk without threat of accountability).
10. In the United States, finance has benefited from an increasing fraction of economic
growth. See Martin Wolf, Why Is It So Hard to Keep the Financial Sector Caged?, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9987c5c4-d41f-Ildc-a8c6-0000779fd2ac.html ("The
US itself looks almost like a giant hedge fund. The profits of financial companies jumped
from below 5 per cent of total corporate profits, after tax, in 1982 to 41 per cent in 2007,
even though their share of corporate value added only rose from 8 to 16 per cent."). In
order to determine whether the financial sector has outgrown its utility, policymakers should
ask "what fraction of the economy's total returns to productively invested capital is absorbed
up front by the financial industry as the costs of allocating that capital." Benjamin M.
Friedman, The Failure of the Economy & the Economists, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKs, May 28, 2009, at
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the critical role of a functioning financial sector is not.
The structural dilemma of all firms operating in this sector is the asset-
liability mismatch: the basic conflict between guaranteeing a return of
capital (e.g., insurance claims, interest on deposits) while also putting that
capital at risk. This tension is omnipresent and engenders fragility in the
financial system. Currently, capital adequacy regulation is the chief
method regulators employ to foster the continuous healthy operation of the
financial sector." Regulators impose minimum capital requirements to
counteract the tendency for financial firm insolvencies to result in two
categories of negative externalities: first, bailout costs to taxpayers resulting
from the moral hazard effects of government safety nets and second,
systemic losses to the broader economy from systemic risks that build up in
the financial sector.
Bailout costs result when taxpayers foot the bill for public expenditures
to fund government safety nets. When a nonfinancial firm maintains a
capital buffer, it signals its financial health and ability to pay creditors as
debts come due, and thereby reduces its cost of capital. Under such
circumstances, creditors lacking recourse to assets or a third-party
42. Friedman correctly laments that this is a question "which no one seems interested in
addressing." Id. Professor Dirk Bezemer has recently made a similar point, acknowledging
the critical role of finance, but noting the dangers of "financializing" the economy. See Dirk
J. Bezemer, "No One Saw This Coming": Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models
16 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 15892, 2009) ("Financial
innovation ... serves the real economy's need, in that it boosts real-sector productivity and
its ability to service its increased debts. But it also opens up the possibility of a sustained drain
of liquidity from the real to the [financial] sector, so inflating asset prices-a credit bubble,
or harmful 'financialization' of the economy."). Under Bezemer's "financialization"
scenario, debt levels increase steadily, eventually using financial assets as collateral for new
borrowings, and in the process the fraction of an economy's total returns are absorbed up
front by the finAncial sector. The real economy (government, households, and firms) will
ultimately have to service the debt since debt backed by capital gains in financial assets
cannot expand infinitely. Id. At a certain point in the cycle, the debt service burden
increases to the point that the financial system becomes extractive to, rather than supportive
of, the real economy. Id. In Bezemer's terms, there emerged a "growing imbalance in the
flow of funds between the real and financial sectors" and by analyzing the macro flows of
funds from an accounting perspective reveals the "extent to which the economy had grown
dependent on asset price gains." Id. at 17.
11. This is not a necessary state of affairs. It is also possible to promote solvency
through directly regulating the extension of credit. For instance, had U.S. federal banking
regulators not removed loan-to-value (LTV) minimums on home mortgage loans extended
by federally regulated banks, credit flow into the subprime housing sector would have been
cut off at the spigot and the credit crisis would have been averted. Consider in this context
the experience of the comparatively salubrious Canadian banking sector during the 2008
credit crisis: Canada had a requirement that any mortgage loan with an 80% or greater
LTV ratio had to be privately insured.
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guarantee would be expected to price credit according to, among other
factors such as loan indenture covenants, the amount of equity capital a
debtor firm maintains; the greater the equity capitalization, the lower the
costs of financial distress. 12 This dynamic, which is routine in other
industries, is inapposite in the financial context because of the taxpayer-
funded safety net financial institutions receive in the form of de jure
government safety nets (e.g., state insurance guarantee funds, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance) and de facto too-big-to-
fail support (e.g., support for holding companies such as American
International Group (AIG), Citigroup, Bear Stearns). Creditors, knowing
there is at least a partial backstop guarantee from government, lack
incentives to properly monitor risk and price credit accordingly. Since
private parties lack incentives to monitor the use of the firm's capital, levels
of risk should outpace socially optimal levels, especially during times of
stress. The rationale of capital adequacy regulation, then, is to ensure
through public regulation that financial institutions enjoying government
safety nets are subject to the discipline that capital markets and
counterparties would normally impose but do not impose because of moral
hazard.' 3 Safety and soundness are achieved through an enforced capital
requirement serving as a proxy for market forces.'4 In this respect, we can
12. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 497-510 (2003) (describing the various costs of financial distress).
13. See RICHARD Scorr CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 309 (4th ed., 2009) ("By inhibiting market discipline of banks, deposit
insurance creates incentives for excessive risk-taking and impels the government to protect
the taxpayers through safety-and-soundness [i.e., capital] regulation."); JEAN-CHARLES
ROCHET, WHY ARE THERE So MANY BANKING CRISES? THE PoLTICS AND POLICY OF
BANK REGULATION 1 (2008) ("The two main components of this public intervention [into
the banking market] are on the one hand the financial safety nets (composed essentially of
deposit insurance systems and emergency liquidity assistance provided to commercial banks
by the central bank) and on the other hand the prudential regulation systems, consisting
mainly of capital adequacy (and liquidity) requirements, and exit rules, establishing what
supervisory authorities should do when they close down a commercial bank.").
14. Theoretically, the government could, as an effective guarantor of deposits and
many debts, price its guarantee and secure covenant protections in a negotiation with each
financial institution availing itself of a government safety net protection. Under normal
circumstances, this is precisely what private creditors negotiate in credit documentation.
However, because lender-of-last-resort facilities are provided in exigent circumstances when
(1) the government, due to systemic risks or political realities, has little credible exit threat,
and (2) no private market otherwise exists to perform a "market check" for the government
credit, it is impractical to price the government's extension of credit at the moment such
pricing would be required. A far more sensible approach is embodied in the current state of
affairs; it is better to set the rules of the game ex ante so as to minimize the likelihood of
recourse to the safety net. Cf DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 20 (2008) (noting that when extending discount
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think of bank capital as a partial collateralization of the claims of bank
creditors and, more importantly, future taxpayers that might be forced to
bail out financial institutions.
The insolvency of a large financial institution might also pose systemic
risks to the financial system due to the lack of adequate incentives for any
particular market counterparty/creditor to mind the systemic risk that can
build up. Knock-on effects frorn a systemically significant insolvency can
threaten to paralyze the entire sector, which in turn can plunge an
economy into a deep recession.15 Moreover, unlike other industries where
insufficiently capitalized businesses can be broken up into their constituent
assets and put to more efficient uses, a rash of insolvencies (or a series of
defaults) in the financial sector can threaten to spur a systemic contagion
that can freeze up credit formation and, as a result, economic growth. For
instance, in the normal course of operation a bank obtains and processes
extensive borrower-specific data and monitoring experience that is lost
when the bank fails.16 The loss of this data and experience may result in a
lack of availability of willing lenders to finance the borrower's continued
activities. Another systemic cost of financial insolvency is the threat to the
integrity of the payments system, which can cause the cessation of inter-
bank transfers and prevent the efficient flow of capital resources and
international trade.17 More recently, we witnessed that the absence of
capital behind AIG's positions in the collateral default swap market
exposed several systemically important counterparties to massive losses that
were avoided only through government intervention. Again, with systemic
risks as with moral hazards, the government steps in to provide in extremis
capital at the expense of taxpayers.
Practically speaking, capital requirements foster solvency by (1) ensuring
that regulated firms have a capital buffer to absorb unexpected losses and
window credit, the central bank "may believe it has little practical choice, in either financial
or political terms, but to provide the credit needed to keep [a] bank afloat").
15. See Abdul Abiad et al., 'hat's the Damage? Medium-Term Output Dnamics After Banking
Crises 7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/245, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09245.pdf ("The medium-term output
losses following banking crises are substantial: seven years after the crisis, output has
declined relative to trend by close to 10 percent on average."); CHARLES GOODHART ET AL.,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, How AND WHERE Now? 1 (1998) (summarizing an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) study finding a correlation between banking sector
problems and sizeable reductions in gross domestic product).
16. See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression, 73 AM. EcON. REv. 257, 257 (1983).
17. See Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks,
Securities Finns, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUAcY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING,
SECURITIES, INSURANCE 15, 19 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005).
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(2) imposing a de facto risk tax'8 on financial institutions to provide a
disincentive to engage in excessive risk-taking on all of its borrowed
capital.19 From the viewpoint of regulated firms, in most cases 20 minimum
regulatory capital requirements constitute risk taxes because they restrict
the bank's ability to make profits. If a bank is required to hold capital
against a risky asset portfolio, it is obviously not able to deploy that capital
to seek returns. Its profit opportunity set is limited vis-a-vis its profit
opportunity set absent regulatory capital requirements. Where firms
perceive their capital requirements to be excessive, they will seek to engage
in capital arbitrage by deploying capital in risky pursuits that are less
burdened by the regulatory capital adequacy framework.21
18. A minimum capital requirement will operate as a risk tax if the following
assumptions obtain: (1) an imperfectly elastic supply of equity finance, and (2) temporal
limitations for accumulating retained earnings as equity. In such a scenario, an institution
will likely be required to reduce its risk-weighted assets to maintain acceptable capital ratios,
foregoing returns. See, e.g., Sun Bae Kim & Ramon Moreno, Stock Prices and Bank Lending
Behavior in Japan, I EcoN. REV. FED. REs. BANK S.F. 31, 33-34 (1994).
19. Other policy justifications for capital regulation are of comparatively less
importance, such as ensuring available capital for expansion into new activities, or are
derivative of the enumerated factors above, such as protecting government deposit insurance
funds and counteracting the moral hazard occasioned by these government safety nets. See
TARULLO, supra note 14, at 16 n.3.
20. The "most cases" qualification is necessary to address cases when capital market
expectations for capital reserves exceed minimum regulatory capital requirements. Capital
markets might require that a firm hold capital in order to respond quickly to acquisition
opportunities or market expansion, or to weather an expected downturn in asset values.
21. An example of this phenomenon is the proliferation of off-balance sheet liabilities
such as asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCPCs) and structured investment
vehicles (SIVs), sponsored by major international banks predominantly from 2004 to 2008.
Banks established AiBCPCs as off-balance sheet entities funded with minimal equity and
large issues of commercial paper. In order to secure low funding costs, sponsoring banks
would offer contingent recourse to their balance sheets in favor of the commercial paper
investors in the form of liquidity or credit enhancement. The ABCPCs and SIVs would
invest the proceeds from the commercial paper issuances in asset-backed securities,
especially those backed by residential mortgages. The contingent commitments to the
ABCPCs and SIVs carried a capital charge of 0.8%-one-tenth of the 8% capital charge
required if the asset-backed paper were held on the banks' own balance sheets. Eventually,
the market value of the assets collapsed, the ABCPCs and SIVs were unable to roll over
their commercial paper funding, and the investors looked to the contingent commitments of
the banks. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve guaranteed investments in money
market mutual funds, which were the principal funding entities of ABCPCs. Given the
severity of the financial markets crisis, the Federal Reserve determined that it was necessary
to, in effect, backstop with taxpayer funds a pure capital regulation arbitrage play! For a
succinct summary of the rise and fall of the ABCPC industry, see Viral V. Acharya &
Philipp Schnabl, How Banks Played the Leverage "Game," in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILIrY:
How To REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 83, 83-100 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson
eds., 2009) [hereinafter RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY].
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Because capital promotes solvency and also limits profitability, regulators
seek to set the capital requirement at a level that balances the need for
prudent risk management with the need for firms to be competitive in the
marketplace. Stated more technically, the tradeoff is between the marginal
social benefit of reducing the risk of the negative externalities from financial
institution failures (such as bailout costs and systemic risks) and the
marginal social cost of reduced output and productivity due to the
regulator-imposed reduction in the volume of finance provided to
consumers and businesses.22 Of course, achieving the optimal balance
between these countervailing considerations is only a theoretical possibility.
Because the social benefits and costs are likely impossible to quantify and
the periodicity of examinations has normally limited information gathering,
regulators historically have resorted to uniform minimum capital levels to
achieve this balance.
This uniform-rules-of-general-application approach, however, suffers
from a lack of risk sensitivity, which compromises the balance and
exacerbates the inherent arbitrage threat. Even if the capital adequacy
rules are formulated precisely and at the optimal level of generality at time
Ti, the limits of human foresight inhibit the extent to which those rules will
achieve the regulatory objective at time T 2.23 The resulting mismatch
between regulatory tools and regulatory objective is widest in highly
dynamic industries such as financial services. Each successive period of
financial innovation increases the complexity of the financial sector and,
with it, the breadth and depth of risks facing regulated firms. As a result,
regulator-regulatee information asymmetries widen and prevent regulators
from exercising supervision over this new complexity. The major structural
reforms in the capital adequacy regulatory regimes discussed below have
occurred in response to periods of increasing complexity in the financial
industry and a perceived dearth of effective risk sensitivity. In recent years
financial innovation has overwhelmed capital adequacy regulatory systems
and regulators have attempted to bridge the resulting informational gap by
incorporating sophisticated, internally-generated, proprietary risk
management and risk estimation models into the capital adequacy
regulatory regime. Put another way, financial institutions have become too
complicated for non-insiders to acquire the information necessary for
effective regulation, and regulators have turned to insiders to mine the data.
22. See TARULLO, supra note 14, at 23-27; Anthony M. Santomero & Ronald D.
Watson, Determining an Optimal Capital Standardfor the Banking Industy, 32J. FIN. 1267, 1270-72
(1977).
23. SeeJuLiA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 7-11 (1997) (discussing how rules are
inherently indeterminate and almost always over- or under-inclusive).
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While this Article portrays capital adequacy reform as a reactive process,
with regulators responding to the complexity paradigm, regulators need not
assume such a posture regarding complexity. Complexity results from the
dynamic interaction of technology, competition, and rent-seeking forces
with regulation, which sets the rules under which the other factors
operate.24 Regulation is both constitutive of, and responsive to, complexity.
Such policy-created market conditions include, among countless others,
globalized capital markets (e.g., removal of capital controls in late 1970s);
cross-sectoral consolidation (e.g., repeal of Glass-Steagall encouraged
formation of one-stop-shop financial bazaars like Citigroup and AIG);
arbitrage (e.g., initial Basel Accord's differential treatment of off-balance
sheet exposures fueled securitization of mortgages); increased intersectoral
competition (e.g., interest rate deregulation in early 1980s allowed banks to
compete aggressively in deposit-like markets with nonbank institutions);
credit expansion (e.g., abandonment of Federal Reserve margin
requirements removed check on bubbles in housing and consumer finance);
financial product deregulation (e.g., authorizing banks to offer adjustable
rate mortgages enabled banks to offer complex loans that many
homebuyers could not understand); and shifts to riskier lines of business
(e.g., permitting banks to engage in the securitizations and derivatives
business in the 1990s). Thus, to a large degree, the complexity paradigm
qua regulatory dilemma is a creation of earlier decisions by the same
regulators that now struggle to regulate it. Therefore, an alternative
solution to regulating the complexity paradigm is to cut off the head of the
monster: that is, to use state power to enforce simplicity. 25 By reducing the
complexity, the regulator could narrow the inherent mismatch between ex
24. See Philip Stephens, Cut the Banks (and Bonuses) Down to Size, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2009, at 11 ("Activity for the sake of it-a characteristic of bloated and ever more complex
wholesale financial markets-serves only those who manage to extract large profits from the
enterprise.").
25. A neoclassical economic critique of enforced simplicity would emphasize that
complexity develops when market participants harness technology to meet counterparty and
customer expectations or to circumvent the effect of regulatory business restraints not
demanded by counterparties (i.e., arbitrage). The former is benign, and the latter would
only be exacerbated by enforced simplicity. Thus, according to this view, technology is
instrumental to, rather than constitutive of, financial innovation and complexity. While on
its own that principle is unobjectionable, a vulgar neoclassical position sometimes overstates
the case and fails to appreciate how dynamic and unpredictable technology can expose
financial markets to shocks. However, the neoclassical reminder of arbitrage serves as a
useful reminder that any attempts to enforce simplicity are bound to struggle with the
arbitrage problem. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1, 6-
8, 15-19 (1960) (theorizing that, absent transaction costs, market actors can "transfer and
recombine" legal rights to achieve a desired ultimate result irrespective of the initial
allocation of legal rights).
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ante regulatory rules and regulatory objectives.26 A credible case may be
made that such a "narrow banking" or "utility banking" approach is
desirable for banks receiving the benefit of public insurance and lender of
last resort support.27 These important complexity-related topics are beyond
the scope of this Article, except to the extent that shedding light on inherent
limitations of new governance techniques causes policymakers and
regulators to question whether public goals of finance (e.g., credit
formation, economic stability, monetary policy transmission, risk allocation)
are better achieved by limiting complexity rather than accommodating it ex
post via new governance.
II. BANKS AND THE BASEL COMMITTEE
Traditionally, the business of banking has consisted of performing the
intermediary role of directing funds from entities with surplus (capital
surplus savers) to entities in need of funds (capital deficit borrowers),
pocketing a spread along the way. Fractional reserve banking permits
banks to maintain only a fraction of their depositors' funds as reserves on
hand (i.e., cash in vault). They can then put the nonreserved funds to
productive use by lending to businesses and consumers. Banks' asset-
liability mismatch results from their short-term deposit liabilities and their
long-term loan assets that are vulnerable to interest rate risk, credit risk, call
risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, foreign exchange risk, and
macroeconomic risk.28 This fragility transforms into instability when a
bank's depositors begin to perceive, or even fear, that a bank is suffering
losses in these longer-term assets. Thus, a positive feedback mechanism
may be generated whereby investors withdrawing money on Monday cause
more investors to withdraw money on Tuesday, and so forth. Often, due to
the opacity of banks' asset portfolios, even the most sophisticated
counterparties have little more information on a bank's solvency than the
26. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., John Kay, Unfettered Finance Has Been the Cause of All Our Crises, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2010, at I 1; John Kay, Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Legislation, CENTRE FOR
THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVATION, Sept. 2009, at 3-5, available at
http://www.johnkay.com/2009/09/15/narrow-banking; Wolf, supra note 10. But see FIN.
SERV. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING
CIsis 94 (Mar. 2009) (advocating curtailment of proprietary trading activities, but not all
non-traditional commercial banking intermediation).
28. See SANJAY K. NAWALKHA ET AL., INTEREST RATE RISK MODELING: THE FIXED
INCOME VALUATION COURSE 14 (2005); MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS
52-53 (2004). Banks are therefore said to "borrowfl short, and lend[] long." See Franklin R.
Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications for Financial
Stability and Regulatog Policy, I FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. EcON. POL'Y REv. 27, 27 (1995).
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bank's retail depositors. 29  A run on deposits therefore can quickly
transform into, and be stoked by, counterparty redemptions and collateral
calls.30 While all financial institutions may pose systemic risks, bank
systemic risk is particularly troubling because of the critical functions of
banks in the payments system and the transmission of government
monetary, credit, and exchange rate policies. 3 '
In the case of banks, central banking and deposit insurance are designed
to shore up confidence in the system and mitigate its inherent instability by,
respectively, providing the option of emergency central bank liquidity (in
the United States, via the discount window) to institutions suffering a
sudden increase in deposit withdrawals and shifting the ultimate risk for
bank failures from depositors to the entire industry (or taxpayers, if industry
levies prove insufficient).32 In this context, it is important to recall that, as
discussed above in Part I, the introduction of deposit insurance attenuates
the force of market discipline by insulating banks from price and quantity
reactions by depositors to alterations in a bank's capital levels. 33 Regulatory
29. See TARULLO, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that because banks' assets are
"notoriously difficult" to evaluate, the "asymmetry of information between corporate
insiders and lenders that exists in any situation is compounded in the case of banks").
30. The bank run contagion can also spread among the bank industry itself, as the
massive interbank lending market is based largely on confidence and lacks robust
documentation and monitoring. See Jack Guttentag & Richard Herring, Emergency Liquidity
Assistance for International Banks, in THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 150,
160 (Richard Portes & Alexander K. Swoboda eds., 1987).
31. JosephJ. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern Financial Regulation: Increasing Reliance on a
Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT'L LAW. 43, 47 (2003).
32. Government safety nets include not only deposit insurance and access to central
bank liquidity, but also unconditional FedWire payment guarantees, as well as the entire
regulatory apparatus that watches over the banking sector. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 210.28(b)
(2010) (implying that banks participating in FedWire have access to overdraft facilities at the
Federal Reserve Bank where such banks maintains their respective account); Allen N. Berger
et al., The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, 19J. BANKING & FIN. 393, 400 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Donald 0. Cook & Lewis J. Spellman, Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs:
Toward Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits, 26J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 439, 440
(1994) (cautioning that the insulation of banks from market discipline is incomplete to the
extent depositors believe that the insurer might be incapable of satisfying claims). The
market discipline is transferred to the insuring institutions, which often levy fees (or
premiums) for the insurance. It is theoretically possible to mirror the market discipline by
accurately pricing the deposit insurance according to the likelihood a bank will require its
support. In practice, deposit insurance premiums are largely thought to be dramatically
underpriced, likely on account of a race-to-the-bottom approach to avoid handicapping
domestic banks vis-a-vis their foreign competitors. See Viral V. Acharya et al., International
Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY 365, 366-67
(detailing the problems of arbitrage and the resulting lobbying by financial industries). The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, for the first time, pegged deposit
insurance premiums to a bank's risk-based capital, but only roughly.
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capital requirements therefore aim to approximate the market discipline
black hole left by the introduction of moral hazard associated with the
government's safety net.34  Recent bailout interventions in favor of
stockholders and bondholders by central banks and governments in
connection with the subprime credit crisis obviously deepen moral hazard
problems.
Over time, and coincident with the increases in the complexity of the
banking business3 5 and a gradual decline in capital ratios,3 6 bank regulators
increasingly have focused on capital (and later, on so-called "risk-based
capital") as the primary means of ensuring the soundness of the banking
sector.37 Generally speaking, minimum bank capital requirements consist
of two quantities and a relation between them: (1) a definition of "capital"
that comprises those claims that are first in line to absorb future losses (the
numerator);38 (2) a measure of the exposure to risk that capital is intended
to cover (the denominator); and (3) a required minimum ratio of capital to
that risk exposure. 39
34. Former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Alan
Greenspan explained the moral hazard problem with U.S. banks' safety net as follows:
The safety net-deposit insurance, as well as the discount window-has so lowered
the risks perceived by depositors as to make them relatively indifferent to the
soundness of the depository recipients of their funds, except in unusual circumstances.
With depositors exercising insufficient discipline through the cost of deposits, the
incentive of some banks' owners to control risk-taking has been dulled. Profits
associated with risk-taking accrue to owners, while losses in excess of bank capital that
would otherwise fall on depositors are absorbed by the FDIC.
Testimony Before S. Comm. On Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 1 01st Cong. 1-2 (1990) (statement
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/782/download/27814/Greenspan_19900712
.pdf.
35. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
36. See M.K LEWIS & K.T. DAVIS, DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL BANKING 149 tbl.5.1
(1987) (noting that the ratio of equity capital to total assets for U.S. banks decreased from
18.3% in 1914 to 6.9% in 1985 and that the same ratio for U.K. banks decreased from 12%
in 1900 to 4.6% in 1985).
37. TARULLO, supra note 14, at 21. Other commentators view the ascendancy of
capital adequacy regulation from a public choice lens. See Thomas Oatley & Robert
Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Baselle Accord, 52 INT'L
ORG. 35, 41-44 (1998).
38. Ideally, regulatory capital (the numerator of the capital ratio) should consist of
financial instruments that conduce to the threefold aim of (1) providing a loss buffer for the
governmental providers of the bank safety net, (2) serving as "patient money" that will not
be redeemed during a financial crisis, and (3) helping to discipline bank risk-taking behavior.
As this Article focuses on the use of internal models in calculating risk-weighted assets (the
denominator of the capital ratio), this element of the ratio and the required numerical ratio
will not be the subject of further discussion.
39. Arturo Estrella, A Prolegomenon to Future Capital Requirements, I FED. RES. BANK OF
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Prior to the agreement on the Basel Accord in 1988 (the initial Basel
Accord), bank regulators measured the exposure to risk as a bank's total
assets, much in the same manner we calculate the still-required U.S.
leverage ratio today. Since the initial Basel Accord mandated risk-
sensitivity in calculating exposure to risk, the denominator of the capital
ratio has measured the banks' risk exposure by reference to the Basel
Accord's regulatory risk weighting system. Thus, instead of measuring
regulatory capital against total assets in a risk-agnostic way, it is measured
against assets to which risk weights have been applied to reflect assets'
perceived riskiness in a risk-sensitive way. As described in further detail
below, for the first time Basel II now permits regulated banks to set the risk
exposure component of their regulatory capital ratios by reference to their
own internally-generated risk models.
A. Regulating Bank Capital Adequacy in the United States: A Brief Pre-Baselite
History
The United States was the first jurisdiction to impose generally
applicable minimum capital requirements on its banks. From the
enactment of the National Banking Act of 1864 until the Great Depression-
era legislation, U.S. regulators evaluated capital formally only when a
national bank applied for a charter. 0 Following the Great Depression,
bank authorities turned more attention to capital and solvency of banks
during examinations, but still lacked enforcement tools and, more critically,
express statutory authority to mandate minimum capital levels.4 ' Capital
regulation underwent significant formalization in the early 1980s, as bank
regulators instituted systematized capital levels, in large part due to
unprecedented exposures to riskier sovereign debt. 42 In 1983, Congress
N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv. 1, 2 (1995).
40. See Robert F. Weber, A Brief Pre-Baselite History of Capital Adequacy Regulation
in the United States (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
41. The U.S. bank regulators developed nascent risk-sensitive leverage ratios as early as
the 1950s. Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A legitimate Regulatoty Concern for
Prudential Supervision ofBanking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.. 1299, 1317 (1989) (finding that in
the 1950s the Federal Reserve Board began to use a "simplistic" capital-to-adjusted-risk
analysis for internal purposes); see also EUGENE N. WHITE, COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, THE COMPTROLLER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BANKING:
1960-1990 30, 30 n. 40 (1992) (describing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's
(OCC's) 1974 "Victor program," which compared "classified loans," defined as "100
percent of substandard loans, 50 percent of loans especially mentioned [and] 50 percent [of]
doubtful loans," to total adjusted capital in order to individuate troubled national banks;
those banks with a ratio in excess of 65% would automatically receive special attention).
42. The reasons leading up to this exposure are manifold and outside the scope of this
Article. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the burgeoning Eurodollar markets
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granted regulators express statutory authority to regulate capital on an
ongoing basis. Moreover, in January 1986, U.S. banking regulators
announced a plan to unilaterally implement a risk-based capital adequacy
regime that took into account the various risks to which banks' capital bases
were subject. By the mid-1980s, Congress had transformed the regulation
of capital from a matter of ad hoc enforcement actions to "an ongoing
feature of basic bank supervisory policy."4 3 By moving first, Congress
saddled U.S. banks with a competitive disadvantage vis-ht-vis their
European andJapanese competitors. U.S. banking regulators had in effect
imposed a risk tax on U.S.-based banks-which now had to withhold
capital as a reserve for each new extension of a loan-without any
restrictions keeping capital from migrating offshore. To address each of
these problems, the U.S. banking policy establishment pushed international
policy coordination under the auspices of the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS), eventually resulting in the initial Basel Accord.
B. The Basel Committee and Capital Adequacy: From Basic Risk Sensitivity to an
Internal Models Approach
1. Birth ofan International Policy Coordinator
In December 1974, with world financial markets reeling following the
collapse of two major international banks,4" the central bank governors of
the Gl0 agreed to establish the Basel Committee, consisting of central
bankers and bank supervisors under the auspices of the BIS, to address the
immediate problems arising in connection with the 1974 international
financial crisis. In the longer term, there was an understanding that the
Basel Committee would work to promote some modicum of convergence of
(funded by U.S. balance of payments deficits) and the increasing internationalization and
complexity of financial markets in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly subsequent to the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates in 1971 and 1973, resulted
in banks holding unprecedented levels of currency and interest risks. Banks not only were
exposed to new types of international risks, but the amounts subject to these globalized risks
increased as well. During the same period, large international banks made significant
investments into Eurodollar markets and U.S. banks expanded into foreign markets via
Edge Act and Agreement corporations, as well as joint ventures and foreign direct
investments. Among U.S. banks, foreign-based assets increased from 3% in 1960 to 19% in
1975.
43. Michael P. Malloy, Capital Adequacy and Regulatory Objectives, 25 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 299, 301-02 (2002).
44. See RICHARD DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 156-67
(1984) (describing the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt); GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION LAW, PoucY AND PRACTICE 26-39 (2001)
(describing the failure of Franklin National).
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banking supervisory practices. 45 The Basel Committee's initial focus on
formalizing a coordination framework pursuant to which insolvent
institutions could be wound down gave way to increasing attention to the
prudential concern of protecting the solvency of internationally active
banks and the stability of the international financial system (i.e., the
prevention, rather than the resolution, of insolvencies).
In a 1981 report, the Basel Committee indicated its concern with the
erosion of bank capital ratios and advocated a greater approximation in the
levels of capital employed by large banks. The decade of the 1970s
witnessed a reduction of capital-to-total-assets ratios of all major
industrialized nations except for Switzerland and Italy.46 While
acknowledging that any formal attempt at harmonization of the widely
disparate systems of bank capital regulation was impractical, the Basel
Committee nevertheless envisaged a role for itself in achieving "greater
convergence among its members with regard to national definitions of bank
capital for supervisory purposes." 47 Against this background, a second goal
of the convergence effort became central: if policy coordination was to be
achieved, how could the Basel Committee do so on a competition-neutral
basis?"8 As the United States had been ratcheting up and formally
"legalizing" its minimum bank capital levels in the early 1980s, bank capital
ratios in other G 10 countries, most notably Japan, continued to plummet.
From 1980 to 1985, U.S. banks saw their share of the international banking
business plunge from 30% to 23%, while Japan saw a corresponding
increase for its banks from 20% to 2 6 %. This trend continued throughout
the 1980s and was coincident with Japanese banks operating with much
lower capital ratios than U.S. banks.49
These trenchant conflicts threatened to derail progress on the Basel
Committee's second goal of leveling the competitive playing field, until U.S.
45. See WALKER, supra note 44, at 51 n.150.
46. See BRYCE QUILLIN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION: POLITICAL
ECONOMIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1988 BASEL ACCORD 14 (2008). The decline in the
1970s was a micro-event in a larger trend of declining capital ratios at U.S. banks from as
high as 40% in the 1850s to 6-8% from the 1940s to the present. See Berger et al., supra note
32, at 402 fig.1, 403. The marked decline in the 1940s is attributed in large part to the
establishment of deposit insurance at the FDIC and the related risk-taking incentives created
thereby. See Andr6 Lucas, Evaluating the Basle Guidelines for Backlesting Banks' Internal Risk
Management Models, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 826, 827 (2001) ("[T]he creation of
the [FDIC] in 1933 resulted in a decrease in capital ratios of about 50 percent over a ten-
year period.").
47. See QUILLIN,supra note 46, at 15.
48. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL BANKING: CASES, MATERIALS &
PROBLEMS 75 (1998).
49. See QUILLIN, supra note 46, at 14 fig.2. 1.
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and U.K. banking authorities reached an agreement in principle in 1987 on
capital adequacy convergence that incorporated risk sensitivity for the first
time. Importantly, the United States and United Kingdom announced
their intention to apply these standards to foreign banks already present or
wishing to enter their markets.50  Recalcitrant Committee members,
includingJapan, agreed to move forward on the Basel project.5 '
2. The Initial Basel Accord and the Introduction of Risk Sensitivip
In July 1988, the Basel Committee published the initial Basel Accord,
which set a minimum capital-to-risk-weighted assets ratio of 8%. Like the
1987 U.S.-U.K. accord, the initial Basel Accord determined which risk-
weighting methodologies to apply to bank assets. Under the Accord, assets
are categorized into five risk-weighted buckets according to their perceived
credit risk. The initial Basel Accord's focus on credit risk reflected the then-
current perception that credit risk posed the greatest risk to bank
solvency.5 2 Each risk category carries a specified risk weighting factor (0%,
10%, 20%, 5 0%, or 100/0 ).53  Low risk assets such as U.S. Treasury
securities receive a 0% risk weighting (that is, they are not added into the
denominator of the capital-to-assets ratio), and other assets representing
incrementally higher credit risk receive higher risk weights. For example,
claims against U.S. banks and securities issued by U.S. state and local
governments receive a 20% risk weight; revenue bonds issued by U.S. state
and local governments and first mortgage loans on one-to-four family
residences receive a 50% risk weight; and (1) property, plant, and
equipment, and (2) loans to households and commercial borrowers receive
a 100% risk weight. Amounts at risk pursuant to off-balance sheet items
such as contingent liabilities and derivative instrumentS54 are then
50. Oatley & Nabors, supra note 37, at 49.
51. See Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49
HARv. INT'L LJ. 447, 502 (2008) ("Large international banks could not afford to be absent
from these markets, and direct negotiations between the United States and Japan began
immediately after the announcement of the U.S.-U.K. agreement."); Oatley & Nabors,
supra note 37, at 51-52 (describing how the "primary targets," Japanese banks, responded to
the U.S.-U.K. threats).
52. Recent events might have called this assumption into question, as the post-Gramm
Leach-Bliley expansion of universal banking and the associated trading and derivatives
activities built up significant market risks. As is discussed infra, by the mid-1990s the Basel
Committee had incorporated market risks into the Basel Accord.
53. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 259-60 (describing the four risk weight factor
percentages that U.S. federal bank regulators adopted in their implementation of the initial
Basel Accord); HAL S. Scorr, INTERNATIONAL FiNANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND
REGULATION 332 (14th ed., 2007).
54. The initial Basel Accord recognized that the total exposure of a bank with respect
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multiplied by a "credit conversion factor" that reflects the Basel
Committee's judgment of the likelihood that the off-balance sheet item will
give rise to a balance sheet liability5 5 The normal risk weights then apply
to the resulting "credit equivalent amounts" to yield the required capital to
be held against the off-balance sheet item. However, a 50% reduction
applies to derivative instruments.56
For all its achievements in policy convergence, the initial Basel Accord
only took into account one component of credit risk-counterparty default
risk-and left other significant risks such as interest rate risk, foreign
exchange risk, operational risk, legal risk, and market risk, as well as
nondefault-related credit risks such as downgrade or migration risk, spread
risk, settlement risk, and credit concentration risk outside of its risk-based
framework.5 7  Conversely, banks received no credit from sound risk
mitigation techniques such as requiring collateralization or guarantees of
loans or hedging exposures.58 The risk-weighting categories (or "crude risk
buckets" 59 ) also were necessarily overbroad and failed to account for the
to certain derivative instruments (e.g., forwards, swaps, options) is limited to the cost of
replacing the cash flow in the event of a counterparty default. See BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND
CAPITAL STANDARDS 20 (1988) (updated to April 1998) (hereinafter BASEL ACCORD). As
such, "credit conversion factors" are applied to the replacement cost rather than the
nominal amounts of such instruments.
55. Id. at 12-13, 19-25.
56. Id. at 25 (asserting that the reduction in capital required to be held against such
derivatives is in recognition that "most counterparties in these markets, particularly for long-
term contracts, tend to be first-class names"). This provision of the accord shows the degree
to which the Basel Committee, even before the internal models approach of Basel II, was
operating under the assumption that banks themselves (especially those "first class names")
could ensure stability; however, recent experience confirms that first class names often house
third-rate operations.
57. For a helpful summary of these sub-components of credit risk, see ARNE
SANDSTROM, SOLVENCY: MODELS, ASSESSMENT & REGULATION 82-3 (2006). Technically,
the initial Basel Accord permitted supervisors to develop capital adequacy requirements that
accounted for other types of risk, or to supplement the risk-weighting methodology with
"other methods of capital measurement" (e.g., the FDIC's prompt corrective action regime
and minimum leverage ratio requirements).
58. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 272; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABIUTY OFFICE,
RISK-BASED CAPITAL: BANK REGULATORS NEED TO IMPROVE TRA.NSPARENCY AND
OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO FINALIZING THE PROPOSED BASEL II FRAMEWORK 3-4 (2007)
("Basel I's simple risk weighting approach does not adequately differentiate between assets
that have different risk levels, offers only a limited recognition of credit risk mitigation
techniques, and does not explicitly address all risks faced by banking organizations.").
59. Richard J. Herring, The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Policy: An
Application to the Subpnime Crisis, 26 YALEJ. ON REG. 391, 397 (2009).
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different risk profiles of assets within the same category.6o Furthermore, the
credit conversion factors often operated in a manner that obscured the true
economic risks of bank positions.61 Banks exploited the resulting
opportunities for arbitrage. These lacunae were all the more glaring in that
it was foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk, and not credit risk, that
most directly led to the 1974 bank failures leading to the formation of the
Basel Committee and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis of the mid- 1980s.
In 1991, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA), which implemented the initial Basel Accord
but also required U.S. federal banking agencies to revise their risk-based
capital standards for insured depository institutions to ensure that these
standards take account of interest rate risk, concentration of credit risk, and
the risks of "nontraditional activities." 62 National treatment of these other
risks in non-U.S. jurisdictions was either nonexistent or significantly more
complicated than credit risk. Banks were therefore able to engage in
regulatory capital arbitrage across asset classes and jurisdictions.63
Nevertheless, and despite its manifold and evident unresolved problems, the
initial Basel Accord represented a significant achievement in the realm of
financial policy coordination and has been adopted by countries outside the
Basel Committee and become an almost global standard.64
60. As an example, debt securities issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) members, Mexico (which joined in 1994 and devalued
its currency later that year in the face of a debt crisis) and the Republic of Korea (which
joined in 1996 and experienced a massive currency depreciation in 1997 before receiving a
$58 billion loan from the IMF), carried a 20% risk weight prior to their respective crises-
reflecting an embedded assumption that sovereign credits from these countries were five
times safer than a loan to IBM, which as a corporate exposure carried a 100% risk weight.
61. See Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and the Management and Regulation of
Financial Institutions, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 461, 468-69 (1995) for an illustration about how
structuring a portfolio yielding the return on a group of mortgages through a swap (rather
than holding the underlying mortgages themselves) resulted in an eightfold decrease in the
bank's capital charge.
62. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 305(b), 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). FDICIA also required Federal bank regulators to
impose a leverage test, and instituted a regime of prompt corrective action designed to
counteract the regulatory practice of forbearance by requiring regulators to intervene earlier
on during a period of declining capital or leverage ratios. See George G. Kaufman & George
J. Benston, The Intellectual Hiito of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, in ASSESSING BANK REFORM: FDICIA ONE YEAR LATER 19 (George G. Kaufman &
Robert E. Litan eds., 1993).
63. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 31, at 51-52; Francesco Cannata & Mario Quagliarello,
The Role of Basel II in the Subprime Financial Crisis: Guilty or Not Guilty? 4 (Ctr. for Applied
Research in Fin., Working Paper No. 3/09, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1330417.
64. See WALKER, supra note 44, at 569.
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3. The Internal Models Approach: Delegating Assessments ofMarket Risks and Credit
Risks to Regulated Banks
In the 1990s, financial regulators faced an unprecedented array of
emergent risks to bank solvency, including most prominently the
proliferation of derivatives and the expansion of banks' trading, capital
markets, and off-balance sheet activities. The U.S. bank regulatory regime
which, as noted in Part II.A, was the first to impose capital adequacy
requirements on its banks, was under significant competitive pressures from
other jurisdictions with less onerous regulatory strictures. It is important to
note in this context that during the half century following World War II,
the United States and Japan were the only jurisdictions that mandated
"narrow banking," which prevented banks affiliating with insurance
companies, securities firms, and hedge funds.65 Because the initial Basel
Accord burdened banks from non-U.S. jurisdictions with a competitive
disadvantage vis-a-vis their domestic nonbank competitors, those banks
expanded their activities to search for returns not subject to regulatory
capital taxes. In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act's (GSA) walling-
off of the banking business from nonbanking activities constituted a serious
competitive impediment for U.S. banks in a globalized financial market. In
1991, the Treasury Department unsuccessfully sought the repeal of GSA.66
Notwithstanding this initial congressional rebuff, the U.S. bank regulatory
authorities had attenuated much of GSA's effects and embraced the bank-
as-financial-bazaar model by the time Congress abrogated GSA in 1999
with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
a. Banking in the 1990s: Competition, Globalization, Technology, Complexity,
and Code
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an accelerated shift of large,
internationally active banks away from their traditional business of direct
financial intermediation-that is, providing deposit-based financing to
borrowers in exchange for loans to be held on the banks' balance sheets-
to (1) assuming a more indirect role of earning fee-based income as an
underwriter-facilitator in capital markets activities; (2) acting as a dealer of,
and deploying their own capital in, off-balance-sheet derivatives
transactions; and (3) expanding their trading activities and their risk
65. See Ernest T. Patrikis, Japan's Big Bang Financial Reforms, 24 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 577,
580-85 (1998); TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANK, SEC. AND INs. REGULATORS, THE
SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 70-71 (1995),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20.pdf.
66. See generally U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991).
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tolerance for even traditional lending activities.67 Bankers and regulators
referred to this sectoral dynamic as a shift to "noninterest" income to
distinguish it from the traditional interest income earned on loans. 68 These
trends resulted from declining profitability of the traditional banking
business due primarily to competitive and regulatory developments that
undercut banks' traditional advantages in their returns on assets (asset side
of balance sheet) and their cost of capital (liabilities side of balance sheet).69
These funding pressures, deregulatory initiatives, globalization forces, and
nonbank financial product innovations squeezed the competitive position of
banks severely. Bank regulators permitted the expansion of banks into
these new activities because, in the opinion of most bank regulators,
"permitting wider activities is necessary to ensure that such organizations can
remain competitive." 70 It was better to double down on risk than risk
obsolescence. In the process, banking operations assumed increasing
complexity that resulted in earnings and capital volatility, which in turn
rendered the Basel Accord's formulaic approach to credit risk an awkward
fit for banks' dynamic risk profiles.
67. See GOODHART ET AL., supra note 15, at 38-40.
68. See, e.g., Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 1 03d Cong. 8-
9 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag94/download/
27989/Greenspan_19940922.pdf [hereinafter Greenspan, September 1994 Senate Testimony];
FED. DEP. INS. CORP., BANKING RISK IN THE NEw ECONOMY 11 (2000).
69. While competitive pressures constituted, in my view, the proximate cause of the
transformation of banking groups throughout the decade, other factors contributed to the
scale and speed of the changes. For instance, as discussed below, technology fueled financial
innovation. More indirectly, the ascendancy of finance theory in the late twentieth century
(e.g., option pricing models, portfolio theory) focused on the varieties of finance as functions,
with little regard for the institutions performing the functions. Accordingly, as finance
theory was increasingly applied to practice, the traditional institutional demarcations
between, on the one hand, banks and, on the other, insurance companies and securities
firms, appeared (at least from a theoretical perspective) as anachronisms. Cf Robert C.
Merton, Future Possibilities in Finance Theoy and Finance Practice 5-6, (Hary. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 01-030, 2000), available at http://www.signallake.com/innovation/
FuturePossibilities.01.030.pdf (explaining how a functional perspective on financial
innovation is preferable to an institutional perspective because institutions often use finance
theory to change their traditional product mix to better accommodate the functional
demands of users of financial services).
70. Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 18 (1990)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag90/download/27814/
Greenspan_19900712.pdf (emphasis added).
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i. The New Financial Code
During the 1990s and into the 2000s, new risk management technologies
enhanced dramatically the perceived ability of large financial institutions to
identify and quantify risks, leading to increased confidence in investment
and hedging strategies that utilized data from those technologies. A new
risk management industry hailed its ability to imbue advances in theoretical
finance with mathematical precision through the use of new computer
systems and software technologies that collect, organize, and analyze data
in a systematized manner.7' A new cadre of risk management professionals
emerged to administer these technologies, most of whom had scientific or
mathematical training to complement their finance backgrounds. Risk
managers aimed to measure, with technical precision, the "value at risk"
(VaR) associated with certain products and events. Banks and securities
firms generated proprietary intellectual property or purchased software or
consultant services from third-party vendors to manage risk and promote
new product offerings. This new financial code underlying the new
banking business model developed outside the view of bank regulators, and
formed part of a broader trend where information technology and
information processing become an increasingly important source of
competitive advantage and, ultimately, wealth.72
These new technologies facilitated three critical developments in late
twentiethth century finance: (1) VaR methodologies expanded from their
initial role of gauging correlation of debt and equity market risks to
measuring the impact of credit risks associated with longer-maturity assets
such as loans; (2) credit assessment technologies were a contributing cause
of banks' loss of their traditional advantage in processing credit
information, but banks were able to channel technologies to their
advantage in developing new products that banks were well positioned to
develop with their traditional clients, such as over-the-counter. (OTC)
derivatives; and (3) large banks employed computer technologies to develop
sophisticated economic capital (as distinguished from purely regulatory
capital) models that sought to ensure that firms had sufficient capital to
meet the expectations of the capital market, and subjected these models to
"stress testing" and "scenario analysis" to evaluate how a firm would be
71. For a brief discussion of the "systemic coding" of digital information by businesses,
see Kenneth A. Bamberger, supra note 4, at 682-83.
72. Cf Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theoy of Freedom ofExpression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3, 13-14 (2004) (discussing conflict between
democratization of digital conflict and the "increasing importance of digital content as a
source of wealth and economic power").
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affected by hypothetical sets of seriously adverse events.73
First, the development of VaR models purported to enable banks to form
a more complete understanding of potential loss associated with any given
position. VaR attempts to measure the maximum possible loss of a
portfolio over a given time horizon at a specified confidence level. 74 In
other words, VaR models yield a numerical assessment of the maximum
loss a position might incur over a specified time period (the time horizon)
and with a specified probability tolerance (the confidence interval).
Because VaR is an expression of probability and maximum loss, it does not
purport to assess literally the exposure at risk associated with a position,
which in most circumstances would be 100% of the asset's value.
Moreover, the assumed distributions of VaR techniques are where the
techniques become the most useful. Since there is no a priori reason for
assuming a normal distribution in the context of financial outcomes,
pioneers of the VaR techniques employed powerful new computer software
to derive statistical model distributions based on which future returns could
be predicted (within a given confidence interval).75 J.P. Morgan was largely
responsible for the development of VaR technologies in 1994 and began to
sell software including its proprietary VaR methods in 1996. The first wave
of VaR techniques only quantified VaR due to market risks. It took little
time, however, before risk managers appreciated the broader applicability
of the putative ability of VaR techniques to quantify "maximum" possible
loss amounts associated with particular risks, some of them non-market-
related. 76 By the late 1990s the most sophisticated banks had begun to use
VaR to classify loan assets into credit risk classes and to use those
classifications in allocating capital.77
73. See James A. Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in
Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 731, 737-38 (2009).
74. See Philippe Jorion, Risk2: Measuring the Risk in Value at Risk, 52 FIN. ANALYSTSJ. 47,
47 (1996); Lucas, supra note 46, at 829.
75. Typical modeling techniques include pure historical data approaches, which use
historical data alone to determine loss distribution, and so-called "Monte Carlo"
simulations, which use historical data to estimate loss but add the use of random sampling
driven by advanced computing power.
76. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part V.C.2, some commentators view the
VaR construct to be inherently suspect. See, e.g., Nassim Taleb, Against Value at Risk: JNassim
Taleb Replies to Philippe Jorion, FOOLEDBYRANDOMNESS.COM (1997) (expressing skepticism in
"[t]he act of reducing risk to one simple quantitative measure on grounds that 'everyone can
understand' it").
77. Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, International Banking Conference: The Challenges of
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Second, the emergence of risk management and credit assessment
computer and software technologies permitted nonbank lenders to
intermediate in loan markets with increasing frequency. Those
technologies also enabled banks to transition into new, often riskier,
financial products that they began to offer more frequently in the 1990s.
New code interacts dynamically with riskier business models; the former
gives rise to the latter, which in turn encourages the assumption of
additional risks on the grounds that those new risks are limited by the same
risk management technologies. Furthermore, as risk management
technology advances, it reduces costs for future innovations, propelling the
innovation process.7 8
Banks also harnessed this new code to turbo-charge the fee-based
securitization and derivatives business and migrate away from traditional
forms of bank intermediation. Using new computer models to model cash
flows, credit risk, and quality of credit support, originators could now
transfer a pool of credit assets-such as credit card receivables, mortgages,
and leases-without regard for the credit risk posed by any individual
debtor. These new technologies transformed fundamentally the
relationship between debtors and creditors by giving rating agencies,
issuers, underwriters, and purchasers access to aggregated data predicting
the likelihood of default on obligations constituting the securitized pool of
assets. Rating agencies developed their own technologies to assess the
credit quality of a securitized pool before stamping their credit rating
imprimatur on the various tranches of a securitization transaction.79
Because a priori models predicted the performance of the pool itself, it
became less important for securitization professionals, including bankers, to
employ a banker's traditional skill of assessing whether a specific debtor
would be able to repay a loan. A debtor default would register only as a
loss to the lowest tranche of securitized debt. The importance of computer
technologies was not limited to VaR modeling techniques; originators also
utilized marketing software, data mining programs, and advanced credit
reporting to select creditworthy borrowers and set appropriate interest
rates.8 0 For example, a credit card executive boasted that since the mid-
1990s the sector
has turned the analysis of consumers into a science rivaling the studies of
DNA or the launching of the Discovery spaceship into orbit. The
78. See Merton, supra note 61, at 463 ("The total reduction in costs has the effect of
reducing the threshold of benefit needed to cover the cost of a new innovation.").
79. See Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed
to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1359, 1377 (2009).
80. See Gerding, supra note 6, at 144.
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mathematics of virtually everything consumers do is stored, updated,
categorized, churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from every
possible angle in hundreds of the most powerful computers and by among
the most creative minds anywhere.8'
In addition to growth in credit card and mortgage lending (and related
securitizations), modeling advances contributed in large part to the
burgeoning derivatives market throughout the decade.82 As a result of the
reliance on computer modeling and aggregated data, an emergent
preference for quantitative, standardized information over qualitative
information-a "mathematicization" of finance-took hold among
financial institutions.83 A central premise of this Article is that this process
of mathematization is better thought of as a concomitant to the complexity
that took hold in banking business models during this period, rather than as
an absolute enhancement in the accuracy of evaluating risk.
Third, large internationally active banks developed their own "economic
capital models," entirely separate from the regulatory capital framework,
that computed the amount of capital needed to protect the bank from
unexpected future losses within a given confidence level. Most typically,
economic capital models are set up to ensure the firm will remain a going
concern able to attract counterparties 84 with a very high degree of
probability. Economic capital modeling utilizes advanced market and
credit VaR methodologies with long time horizons to assess how much
capital a firm is putting at risk given its current portfolio and future business
plans. Because the economic capital modeling techniques look forward to
evaluate the probability of losses, risk managers submit the models to stress
testing and scenario analysis that test how a bank would respond to future
extreme adverse events, or sometimes a series of adverse events in so-called
"stochastic" tests. These models allow bank management to identify
8 1. Duncan A. MacDonald, Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 23, 2007, at 10.
82. See Merton, supra note 61, at 463 (writing in 1995 that "[t]he rapid five-year growth
in [OTC] derivatives (which are transacted away from a central market putting greater
pressure on the underlying institution's capability to price those derivatives and manage
their risk) reflects a growing confidence in the issuing institutions' modeling and evaluation
skills"); cf Arthur E. Wilmarth,Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 963, 1011 (2009) (highlighting
internet-enabled mass marketing, computerized credit scoring programs, and automated
loan processing as contributing to massive expansion in lending during 1990s).
83. See Cannata & Quagliariello, supra note 63, at 12.
84. While minimum capital requirements are predominantly designed to limit the risk
of a catastrophic insolvency resulting in public losses, they are agnostic as to a firm's going
concern value, which often depends on a firm maintaining capital ratios well in excess of
minimum levels.
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concentrations of risk and opportunities for diversification within a
systematized framework, and therefore represent a "more sophisticated, less
arbitrary alternative to traditional lending limit controls" that banks
otherwise use to limit risk.85 Economic capital could also focus on matters
of shareholder concern-such as market capitalization at risk and going
concern value-rather than simply focusing on book value as regulatory
capital requirements do.86 Moreover, banks use the economic capital
construct to ensure they maintain capital sufficient to maintain their debt
ratings as well as allocate capital across a company group.87
ii. Regulatory and Policyrnaker Reactions to Financial Complexity: In Their
Own Words
The complexity paradigm and the ascendency of the new financial code
did not occur outside the supervision of bank regulators in the United
States and abroad who enabled and encouraged the sectoral shift into new
lines of business with higher risks and returns. Bank regulators authorized
the new business model for two related reasons. First, they believed that a
globalized market for capital and financial services made the traditional
banking model of holding long-term loan assets and short-term low-yielding
deposits untenable. In the process, external regulation by means of
"lay [ing] down, ex cathedra, common rules and ratios that all banks should
follow. . . [was] becoming both less effective and less feasible."B
Regulators perceived that the innovation of the 1990s was different in scale,
if not scope, than preceding bursts of financial innovation, but feared that
further regulation to curb risk would temper financial innovation and slow
economic growth.89 This concern was misplaced from the outset, but it is
85. See Michael B. Gordy, A Risk-Factor Model Foundation for Ratings-Based Bank Capital
Rules, 12J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 199, 199 (2003).
86. Bank managers are responsible to a class of constituencies that overlaps, but is not
coincident, with the class of constituencies that bank regulators protect. Therefore, the
notion of VaR raises the question: whose value is at risk? For instance, the market value of a
banking group's equity is expected to be much higher on the priority of a bank manager
than a bank regulator, who will be more concerned with the balance sheet liquidation value
that ensures safety and soundness of the banking system and the protection of a particular
class of creditors (that is, depositors). See FRANCESCO SAITA, VALUE AT RISK AND BANK
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 19-20 (2007).
87. See id. at 20; Gordy, supra note 85, at 200. Decisions regarding distributions and
dividends are particularly sensitive in the context of operating subsidiaries with minority
shareholders.
88. GOODHARTETAL.,supra note 15, at 39.
89. In the words of former Federal Reserve Governor Laurence H. Meyer, "[t]he
growing scale and complexity of our largest banking organizations . .. raises as never before
the potential for systemic risk from a significant disruption in, let alone failure of, one of
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evident in the remarks of bank regulators throughout the 1990s; it also
evinces the extent to which the economy had come to depend on financial
sector profitability.90
Second, they possessed a cautious, but untested, confidence in the
predictive capability of banks' proprietary risk management functions and
internal risk and capital models, and the theoretical finance underlying
those models. Faced with a banking sector in secular decline, they
authorized banks to enter new markets and product lines with little regard
for their effects on safety and soundness, and began to look to the risk
management and modeling techniques that enabled much of the new
banking industry to perform the task that regulators themselves had by the
mid- 1990s become incapable of performing: monitoring and understanding
the safety and soundness of bank activities. In the capital adequacy
context, regulators quickly perceived the poor fit between the initial Basel
Accord's formulaic "risk buckets" approach to measuring credit risk and
the more dynamic risk profiles of actual banks in the 1990s. The
regulators, overwhelmed by the complexity of a globalized, deregulated
bank industry subjected to cross-sectoral competition and rapid
technological developments, eventually decided to link regulatory capital to
firms' internal capital models.
(a) First Bank Regulatory Premise: Complexity Adds Risk, but Is Needed to
Compete Effectively
Bank regulators recognized the risks inherent in new business models,
but opted to step aside rather than risk "inefficient" regulation that could
put banks at a competitive disadvantage. E. Gerald Corrigan, then the
Chairman of the Basel Committee and President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, warned in 1992 that "[t]he speed, volume, value, and
complexity of international banking transactions have introduced new
linkages and interdependencies between markets and institutions that have
the potential to transmit problems and disruptions from place to place and
these institutions." Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fed. Reserve, Remarks Before the
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference, Prudential Supervision: What Works
and What Doesn't: Supervising LCBOs: Adapting to Change (Jan. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2000/20000114.htm. To Meyer,
remarkably, regulators faced "the unattractive options of exposing our economies to
additional risk in order to obtain financial efficiencies and market choices or of imposing
more regulation with both its attendant moral hazard and inefficiencies." Id. The lesson
learned painfully in 2007 was the folly of assuming a substantial overlap between "financial
efficiencies" and "market choices." Id.
90. For a discussion on the predominance of financial sector growth and profitability in
developed economies, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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institution to institution at almost breakneck speed." 91  In addition,
Corrigan registered the Basel Committee's concern that "banking groups
by themselves, but especially in combination with insurance and securities
firms, are becoming very complex organizations" and that "the world of
banking and finance has become very complex and perhaps more risky as
technology, competition, and deregulation irreversibly alter the framework
within which financial institutions and their supervisors must function." 92
The remarks also evince regulators' growing fascination (which would
become increasingly important throughout the decade) with the
"management information systems that will provide the top management of
financial institutions with the tools and the information to ensure that
applied technology is being used in a safe, sound, and prudent manner."93
Governor Laurence H. Meyer stated in 2000 that "[flor the past decade or
so supervisors have recognized that snapshots of the balance sheets of
complex banking organizations are not very helpful for supervisory
evaluations. Positions just change too rapidly." 94
U.S. lawmakers attempted several times to legislate fulsome derivatives
regulation in the early 1990s. 95 In 1994 and 1995, members of the U.S.
91. E. Gerald Corrigan, Chairman, Basel Comm., Remarks Before the Seventh
International Conference of Banking Supervisors in Cannes, France: Challenges Facing the
International Community of Bank Supervisors (Oct. 8, 1992), in FED. RES. Q. REv., Autumn
1992, at 6. In his initial remarks, Chairman Corrigan characterized the challenges of bank
regulators in 1992 as "the most demanding and vexing in the post-World War II period."
Id. at 1. Within five years, the industry would be embroiled in the Mexican "peso crisis," the
Asian currency crises, and near collapses of institutions due to failure to monitor derivatives
transactions (as with Barings Bank). Corrigan, then, was stating things too equivocally: in
fact, the structural dilemma of post-Bretton Woods bank supervision seems to be that at any
given point bank supervisors can state unequivocally that the current state of the banking
industry is the most "demanding and vexing" from a systemic risk standpoint since World
War II. For example, consider the remarks of then Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen
in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in 1994
following the collapse of the thrift industry: "Our country has just emerged from its worst
financial crisis since The Great Depression. One of the lessons of that crisis is that our bank
regulatory system is cumbersome and antiquated." Banking Industy Regulatoy Consolidation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 48 (1994) (statement
of Lloyd Bentsen, Sec'y, Department of Treasury).
92. See Corrigan, supra note 91, at 4. Corrigan undid his qualification that the banking
industry is "perhaps" more risky later in his remarks: "[W]hile we and others can engage in
a lively debate about whether international banking in the nineties is likely to be more or less
risky than it was in the past, I believe we would all be well served to operate on the assumption
that systemic risk may be greater as we look ahead." Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Meyer, FFIEC Remarks, supra note 77, at 1.
95. The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 included provisions to improve the
enforceability of netting contracts, which reduce the legal risks stemming from the failure of
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Congress proposed several bills to introduce sweeping regulatory reform in
the area of derivatives. These bills called for varying degrees of regulatory
oversight of the derivatives activities of banks, ranging from disclosure
requirements to full-blown capital requirements and an outright ban on
derivatives transactions for FDIC-insured depository institutions.96
Representative Henry Gonzalez of Texas, a co-sponsor of the bill that
received the most attention-the Derivatives Safety and Soundness
Supervision Act of 1994-warned that "growing bank involvement in
derivative products is . .. like a tinderbox waiting to explode. In the case of
many market innovations, regulation lags behind until the crisis comes, as it
has happened in our case with [savings and loans] and banks." 97 By the
time that bill was re-introduced, Representative Gonzalez lamented the
"bank regulatory agencies['] claims that legislation was not necessary." 98
Senator Byron Dorgan introduced a radical bill that aimed to achieve a
simple result: prohibiting FDIC-insured banks from engaging in derivatives
activities. Senator Dorgan's remarks when introducing the bill indicate his
preference for a narrow banking industry:
What investors do with their own money is their own business. But what
they do with money insured by the American taxpayers, is the business of
Congress. The purpose of deposit insurance is to encourage saving. It is to
promote a pool of capital that is available to build homes and businesses and
jobs. Deposit insurance is not supposed to underwrite rampant speculation
on Wall Street, and my bill will help prevent that from happening.99
Notably, each of these legislative proposals emphasized to varying
degrees the importance of management involvement in and oversight of
banks' derivatives activities. The Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994 went
further, seeking to codify mandatory internal controls and procedures for
derivatives programs. Congress never enacted any of these bills, in large
part due to the Federal Reserve's steadfast belief that "[w]e must not lose
sight of the fact that risks in financial markets are regulated by private
firms active in derivatives. That legislation also required regulators to increase capital
standards for institutions with significant interest rate risk associated with derivatives or
other instruments, and it required banks to limit their interbank credit exposures from
derivatives and other sources.
96. See Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of 1995, H.R.
20, 104th Cong. (1995); Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of
1995, H.R. 20, 104th Cong. (1995); Derivatives Dealers Act of 1995, H.R. 1063, 104th
Cong. (1995); Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994, H.R. 4503, 103d
Cong. (1994); Derivatives Limitations Act of 1994, S. 2123, 103d Cong. (1994); Derivatives
Supervision Act of 1994, S. 2291, 103d Cong. (1994).
97. 139 CONG. REc. 13,393 (1993).
98. 141 CONG. REc. E35 (daily ed.Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Gonzalez).
99. 140 CONG. REc. 10,469 (1994).
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(b) Second Bank Regulatoy Premise: The New Financial Code Provides an
Effective Check on Riks to Safety and Soundness from New Bank
Activities
Federal bank regulators sought to harness banks' internal risk models to
promote their public regulatory goals of safety and soundness. For
instance, 1995 interagency guidelines required banks to establish internal
controls and information systems that provide for effective risk
management and adequate procedures to safeguard assets.' 0' Regulators
perceived risk management technologies as a tool to minimize the
burgeoning special risks posed by derivatives. In 1993 the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) issued Circular No. 277, titled "Risk
Management of Financial Derivatives."10 2 Circular No. 277 set forth
extensive risk management guidelines governing derivatives activities
conducted by national banks, but limited its new capital adequacy
discussion to a general admonition that banks' boards of directors "should
ensure that the bank maintains sufficient capital to support the risk
exposures" from their banks' derivatives activities.103 Similarly, the Federal
Reserve issued trading- and derivatives-related risk management guidance
in the mid-1990s, but without requiring additional capital or limiting the
extent or magnitude of derivatives activities. 104  In 1998 when the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) published a request for
100. Testimony before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
103d Cong. 26 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/
805/download/27981 /Greenspan- 19940525.pdf. [hereinafter Greenspan, May 1994 House
Testimony].
101. The agencies promulgated these guidelines pursuant to a congressional mandate in
the 1991 FDICIA law. See Standards for Safety and Soundness, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,674,
35,676 guly 10, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208 & 263).
102. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR No. 277,
RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993), available at 1993 OCC CB LEXIS
101.
103. The remainder of that document's discussion of capital adequacy was limited to a
reminder that banks already had existing capital requirements in place arising under the
Basel Accord's treatment of off-balance sheet items. See id. at 24-25.
104. See MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 7.07 [C] (2004).
Similarly, the 1994 Basel Committee Derivatives Guidelines acknowledged that "[o]ne
outstanding feature of financial markets is the increasing use of sophisticated models by
major institutions as their principal means of measuring and managing risk." BASLE COMM.
ON BANKING REGULATION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES 2 (1994),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdPnoframes= 1 (hereinafter RISK MANAGEMENT
GUIDELINES).
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comments on the possible regulation of OTC derivatives by the CFTC-
including supplementary capital requirements on OTC derivatives
dealers- 0 5 the reaction from the legislative and executive branches was
swift. The Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the Clinton Treasury
Department-which housed the OCC and the OTS-resisted, and
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,106
which exempted nearly all OTC derivatives from CFTC and SEC
oversight. 0 7
The regulatory focus on internal risk management techniques was hardly
a U.S.-specific concern. From 1987 to 1992, bank regulators in the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Singapore, and Switzerland issued rules or
guidance concerning risk management and internal control functions as a
means of curbing derivatives risk at banks. 08 The Basel Committee
published a document titled "Risk Management Guidelines for
Derivatives" in July 1994.109 These guidelines followed a 1993 Group of
Thirty study"o addressing emergent risks attending mounting notional
values of derivatives outstanding. The Basel Committee noted the
increasing prominence derivatives had assumed to the overall risk profile
and profitability of banks,"' and observed that the "growing complexity,
diversity and volume of derivatives products, facilitated by rapid advances
in technology and communications, pose increasing challenges to managing
[credit, market, liquidity, operational and legal] risks."" 2  The Basel
Committee also welcomed the "increasing use of sophisticated models by
major institutions as their principal means of measuring and managing
risk.""13 The report anticipated the likelihood that the internal models
would ultimately provide the most granular information concerning the risk
105. See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,114-27 (May 12, 1998).
106. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A-366 (2000).
107. See 144 CONG. REc. E1505 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (statement of Rep. James
Leach) (stating, regarding the 1998 CFTC proposal, "three of the four government agencies
which have responsibility for overseeing the derivatives market place-the Federal Reserve
Board, the Treasury Department, the [SEC]-have come to the conclusion that the other
principal regulator, the [CFTC], has embarked on a regulatory path at odds with the U.S.
national interest"); David Barboza &Jeff Gerth, Who's in Charge? Agency Infighting and RegulatoU
Uncertainty, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14.
108. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 114(1994).
109. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 104, at 1.
110. GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES (1993).
111. Id. at 2.
112. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 104, at 1.
113. Id. at 2.
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of derivative products, and that it would therefore be important for
supervisors "to assure that they (and external auditors) have staff with
sufficient mathematical knowledge to understand the issues" associated with
these models.114
The European Community's 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive
mandated that banks maintain capital to cover unexpected losses due to
interest rate risks.115 In its recitals, the directive registered the importance
of "the existence, in all institutions, of internal systems for monitoring and
controlling interest-rate risks on all of their business" and noted that "such
systems must be subject to overview by the competent authorities."" 6 The
directive also for the first time set minimum capital requirements in respect
of market risk exposures relating to derivatives contracts.
Chairman Alan Greenspan's 1994 testimony before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
concerning the 1994 GAO report on derivatives, and in particular its
recommendations for increased regulation of banks' derivatives and
proprietary trading activities, provides a lens into the Federal Reserve's
intellectual framework during the 1990s and its concern over the inability
of extant capital adequacy regulation to accommodate an increasingly
complex and dynamic banking industry. Throughout his testimony,
Greenspan remarked on the increasing complexity of financial markets and
evidenced a profound confidence that enhanced risk management
techniques and models developed by banks operated as effective checks on
excessive risk-taking. His comments on market risk capital requirement
proposals illustrated the connection between growing complexity and the
intellectual reliance on internal capital models:
Although the market risks of many banking instruments, including many
derivative contracts, can be accurately assessed using ... simple models [such
as the initial Basel Accord formulae to calculate credit risk capital
requirements], a considerably more sophisticated approach is necessary to
assess more complex instruments, especially those with options
characteristics, and to aggregate different categories of market risk. The
recognition of the need for a more sophisticated approach has led banking
regulators in the United States and abroad to explore carefully the potential
for allowing banks to use their own internal models to assess the need for
capital to cover market risk." 7
To summarize, complexity begets a need for a "more sophisticated
114. Id.
115. Council Directive 93/6, 1993 OJ. (L 141) 1, 7 (EC).
116. Id. at 2.
117. Greenspan, May 1994 House Testimony, supra note 100, at 11.
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approach," which "has led banking regulators" to explore the adoption of
internal models."18 The expansion of derivatives markets was attributable
to advances in risk management technology itself."l9 Greenspan stated
further that he expected that banks would achieve still further progress in
risk management of derivatives activities and that regulators would need to
incorporate consideration of those internally-generated, firm specific
techniques and models into the supervisory process.120
In other 1994 comments, Greenspan echoed his sentiments expressed
throughout the early 1990s. He noted that the "evolving financial firm"
was
becoming so complex that it not only challenges our ability to write laws and
regulations, but-more important-is leading to overly complex rules and
regulations that challenge the ability of managers to manage. At least part of
the solution to the increasing complexity in bank risk positions may be to rely
less on the writing of complicated and highly specific rules that apply to all
banks, and to concentrate more on the development of common conceptual
frameworks and flexible supervisory procedures that can accurately
distinguish risks on a bank-by-bank basis. 21
While "traditional" capital adequacy rules have "served us well over the
decades ... as the complexity, if not the dimensions, of bank risk-taking has
increased, the regulatory capital standards also have evolved and become
more complex." 22 To continue ratcheting up the complexity of capital
118. Id.
119. See id. at 7 ("It is important to recognize that significant advances in the
management of market and credit risks, including improvements both in financial
methodology and in the design of management information systems, lie behind the recent
surge in derivatives activity. These advances have made independent, highly skilled risk
management staffs and rigorous measurement and analysis of market and credit risks key
elements of a sound risk management approach for trading activities, and more generally,
for banking activities.").
120. See id. at 7-8, 23; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Remarks Before the 30th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition, Chicago 11-12 (May 12, 1994), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
historicaldocs/ag94/download/27980/Greenspan_ 19940512.pdf ("No matter how good we
become at bank supervision, however, we should always keep in mind that the first line of
supervisory defense must be the quality of the risk management systems used by banks
themselves .... [W]e have recognized for some time that capital rules are often less
meaningful than the sophisticated internal models used by some banks to test the sensitivity
of their net worth to possible future changes in asset prices.") [hereinafter Greenspan,
Chicago Remarks].
121. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
Before the Boston College Conference on Financial Markets and the Economy 9 (Sept. 19,
1994), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag94/download/27990/
Greenspan-19941008.pdf [hereinafter Greenspan, Boston College Remarks].
122. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
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adequacy regulation in lockstep with bank risk-taking would "create] more
problems than [it would] solve." 1 23  In fact, Greenspan continued,
"[i]ntricate capital rules run the very real risk of causing inefficiencies
resulting from complex bank strategies to avoid binding capital constraints
and, at worst, may lead to less measurable and possibly greater bank
exposure to losses beyond capital."1 24  Instead, "[a]t least part of the
solution to the problem of complexity in risk behavior is to rely less on the writing
of rules, such as capital regulations, that apply uniformly to all
banks . . . ."125 While this position stopped short of expressly calling for
calibrating regulatory capital to internal models, the upshot was clear: in
light of the epistemic gap between what regulators could know and what
they aimed to know, regulators needed to focus on institution-specific risk
characteristics. In this context, Greenspan's encouragement of the
development of banks' internal credit rating technologies and the rapid
growth and use of the new financial code in broadening the scope of
financial services is instructive.126 In short, "[t]hat is why the supervisory
effort is increasingly focusing on the evaluation of risk management
systems."1 27
At the 1995 G7 summit in Halifax, the G7 issued a communiqu6
highlighting the importance of policy coordination in addressing challenges
Before the Garn Institute of Finance, University of Utah 8 (Nov. 30, 1994), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag94/download/27991/Greenspan_19941130.p
df [hereinafter Greenspan, University of Utah Remarks].
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id.; see also Greenspan, Chicago Remarks, supra note 120, at 9 ("Greatly increasing
the complexity of capital regulations can only lead to inefficiency as I see it.").
125. Greenspan, University of Utah Remarks, supra note 122, at 9 (emphasis added);
Greenspan, September 1994 Senate Testimony, supra note 68, at 16 ("As we proceed through the
1990s, we should focus on enhancing supervisory practices, rather than on developing new
laws and regulations.").
126. See Greenspan, Boston College Remarks, supra note 121, at 1; Greenspan,
University of Utah Remarks, supra note 122, at 3-6; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks Before the American Bankers Association 2-9
(Oct. 8, 1994), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag94/download/
27990/Greenspan-19941008.pdf [hereinafter Greenspan, ABA Remarks]; Greenspan,
Chicago Remarks, supra note 120, at 4 ("A crucial difference between the banks of today and
those of our traditions .. . is that risk information processing now lies more visibly closer to
the core of banking business because of the blossoming of new financial products and
services that rely so critically on fast and high quality risk information and risk analysis.").
Greenspan also cautioned that, in his opinion, regulators and Congress should not impede
"technological change ... [because it seems so clear that bankers face significant 'new
horizons' in the lending process, regulatory agencies must be especially careful not to place
obstacles in the path of beneficial technological change." Greenspan, ABA Remarks, supra,
at 9.
127. Greenspan, September 1994 Senate Testimony, supra note 68, at 11.
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relating to trade imbalances and currency and financial market instability.
The Halifax communiqu6 is probably most noteworthy for its proposal to
create an "Emergency Financing Mechanism" to serve as an enhanced in
extremis financing facility under the auspices of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).1 28 However, the document also touched on the "growth and
integration of global capital markets," which had "created both enormous
opportunities and new risks." 129  The group emphasized that the
"accelerating pace of financial innovation," combined with "the risks
inherent in the growth of private capital flows [and] the increased
integration of domestic capital markets," posed significant systemic risks. 30
To that end, the G7 envisaged a role for private industry participants to
bridge the information gap between financial actors and their regulators:
"We urge ... strengthened policy advice from international financial
institutions on the appropriate supervisory structures." t3
In response to the G7's 1995 Halifax Summit report, the Basel
Committee and the International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (JOSCO) issued a joint statement in 1996 noting that a
tension existed in the "exponential rate of technological and financial
innovation, including notably the increased use of derivative products." 3 2
On the one hand, innovation can increase systemic risk to the extent it is
not captured in the ex ante regulatory-governance architecture; on the other
hand, complexity often opens up possibilities for "significant enhancements
to risk management procedures."133 A year later at the G7 summit in
Lyon, the G7 finance ministers emphasized the importance of "market-
reinforced prudential supervision" and applauded the Basel Committee's
initiative to address market risk in the capital adequacy framework by
reference to internal VaR models.134 In light of the increasing complexity
of their business models, "primary responsibility for riskmanagement rests
128. Group of Seven, Halifax Summit Communiqui, 17 (June 16, 1995),
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1995halifax/communique/index.html.
129. Id. at 14.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 22.
132. BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS,
BASLE/IOSCO JoINT STATEMENT FOR THE LYoN SUMMIT 1 (1996),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs26.pdPnoframes= 1.
133. Id. Regarding this latter element, because derivatives facilitate the specific
identification and management of risks, they offer the theoretical possibility of encouraging
the safety and soundness of financial institutions, as well as the efficient allocation of risks.
See RiSK MANAGEMENT GUIDEuNES, supra note 104, at 3.
134. Group of Seven, Finance Ministers Report to the Heads of State and Government on
International Monetay Stability, (June 28, 1996), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
summit/19961yon/finance.html; see also infra Part II.B.3.b.
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with market participants."13 5
In 1996 the Group of Thirty136 levied a much bleaker assessment of the
status of mid-1990s financial regulation, noting that "the global operations
of major financial institutions and markets have outgrown the national
accounting, legal and supervisory systems on which the safety and
soundness of individual institutions and the financial system rely."' 37 Prior
to issuing its report, the Group of Thirty surveyed sixty-six large complex
financial institutions, many of which expressed concerns about the quality
of risk management knowledge systems.138 The Group of Thirty focused
on the build-up of systemic risk that the Basel Committee and IOSCO
addressed in their roughly contemporaneous joint report: "the increasing
size, velocity, and complexity of international transactions, and the
increasing concentration of trading activity in a relatively small number of
institutions that play a leading role in multiple markets, suggest an
increased potential for shocks as well as increasing difficulty in improvising
effective crisis-management in the event of a shock."1 39 The report warned
that while a complete breakdown of the world financial system had never
occurred, by the mid-1990s such a scenario was possible due to "the
emergence of large integrated financial firms with corporate structures and
finances of extreme complexity and global scope."l 40 The former paradigm
of capital adequacy regulation missed the mark:
[D]irect and indirect risk exposures within [such a] group are so complicated
and opaque and change so rapidly that it is virtually impossible to monitor
them in anything like real time. Accounting and disclosure practices have
not begun to keep pace. Risk exposures can build up undetected by existing
monitoring systems. In a crisis, both peer institutions and regulators may feel
they have too little information about the condition of a faltering institution
and insufficient time to assess this complex information to warrant taking
action. 141
To remedy in part the ratcheting up of systemic risk, the Group of
Thirty proposed "enhanced responsibility [for] financial institutions" in
financial regulation, which "implies that supervisors will be readier [sic] to
rely on the institutions that they supervise, and that the institutions
135. See Group of Seven, supra note 134, at C134a.
136. The Group of Thirty, or G30, is a group consisting of academics, former
supervisors and regulators, and representatives of the financial industry.
137. GROUP OF THIRTY, GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL SUPERVISION AND
SYSTEMIc RISK v (1997).
138. Seeid. atii.
139. Id. at 5-6.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id. at 8.
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themselves will accept the responsibility to improve the structure of, and
discipline imposed by, their internal control functions." 42  Such a
redesigned governance edifice would recognize that since the underlying
causes of excess risk-taking are firm-specific, the top-down mode of
governance will likely prove inadequate since regulators could not be
expected "to evaluate the quality of traders or the current daily [VaR] in
trading exotic derivative instruments."1 43 Regulators would perennially be
"behind the curve" and also unable to attract the talent required to monitor
such complex systems with adequately high pay.
b. The 1996 Market Risk Amendments to the Basel Accord: Internally Modeling
Market Risk
To address the burgeoning trading book and derivatives activities of
internationally active banks, the Basel Committee initiated a process in
1992 to establish rules that would require banks to set aside capital to
protect against market risks.144 The Basel Committee circulated a paper
outlining a framework for measuring market risk and offering banks a
menu of standardized computational methodologies. Banks reacted
negatively to the proposals, on the grounds that their internally generated
VaR models more accurately captured market risk.145 The Basel
Committee agreed with the banks, and in 1996 it amended the Basel
Accord to include a capital requirement to cover market risks for assets held
in the trading book, expressly permitting the use of internal VaR models in
setting the capital requirement.146
142. Id. at 12.
143. JOHN HEIMANN & LORD ALEXANDER OF WEEDON, GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS,
NATIONAL SUPERVISION AND SYSTEMIC RISK 87 (1997).
144. See Nancy White Huckins & Anoop Rai, Market Risks for Foregn Currency Options:
Basle's Simplified Model, 28 FIN. MGMT 99, 99 (1999).
145. Id.
146. See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL
ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 1 (1996),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdfnoframes= 1 [hereinafter 1996 MARKET RISK
AMENDMENTS]. The Basel Committee was not alone in viewing VaR as a credible tool to
estimate market risk. In 1997, the SEC promulgated Item 305(a) of Regulation S-K, which
mandated that issuers filing documents under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 disclose certain information about market risks from derivatives and
other investment activities. See Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial
Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and
Qualitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments,
Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments, 62 Fed. Reg. 6044,
6064 (Feb. 10, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210). Issuers were given the option of using
VaR as a disclosure method. See id. at 6064-65. Earlier, FAS 119 encouraged, but did not
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The Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks
(MRA) defined market risk to include interest rate risk and equity risk
associated with a bank's trading book (including positions in derivatives and
off-balance sheet instruments) and commodities risk and foreign exchange
risk throughout a bank's asset porffolio.147 Importantly, and in distinction
to the U.S. FDICIA initiative, 148 the MRA did not require that banks
submit to a single formula for computing market risk capital charges.
Instead, regulated banks could choose one of two methodologies of
computing the newly applicable capital charges: a "standardized" approach
or a method "allow[ing] banks to use risk measures derived from their own
internal risk management models." 49  For those banks adopting the
internal models approach, the MRA required them to determine their VaR
over a one-day time horizon (that is, the maximum loss a bank would incur
in a one-day period) at a 99% confidence interval. The VaR estimate
would then be multiplied by a "safety factor" multiplier of three to set the
regulatory capital requirement. 50 This multiplier could be ramped up to
four based on unfavorable model backtesting results showing the lack of
reliability of an internal model.
As a condition precedent to the use of internal models for purposes of
market risk capital, the MRA required the bank regulator to determine that
the bank meets certain general prerequisites to ensure the conceptual
require, companies to report market risk via footnotes by one of five methods, including
VaR. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of
Fin. Accounting Standards No. 119, 12-13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1994).
147. See 1996 MARKET RISK AMENDMENTS, supra note 146, at 1. The U.S. banking
regulators implemented the MRA effective January 1, 1997. See Risk-Based Capital
Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (Sept. 6, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208
& 225).
148. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
149. 1996 MARKET RISK AMENDMENTS, supra note 146, at 3. The 1996 market risk
capital charge exempts certain categories of covered assets (i.e., debt and equity securities in
the trading book, all positions in commodities) from the operation of the base Basel Accord
credit risk charge. Then, the market risk capital charge, whether calculated pursuant to the
"standardized" method or a proprietary internal model, is added to the Basel Accord credit
risk charge to yield a total capital requirement. See THOMAS S.Y. Ho & SANG BIN LEE, THE
OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MODELING: APPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL MARKETS,
CORPORATE FINANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs 602 (2004).
150. By requiring the application of the safety factor multiplier, the Basel Committee
impliedly acknowledged the uncertainty of the VaR estimates. The selection of the
multiplier was largely a political compromise, and lacked any putative scientific justification
at the time of its selection. In 1997, Gerhard Stahl published a paper purporting to show
that a multiplier of three was reasonable to incorporate consideration of model uncertainty
with respect to a model's distribution of risk factors. See Gerhard Stahl, Three Cheers, 10 RISK
67, 67-69 (1997).
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soundness of the models and the adequacy as well as day-to-day usage and
integration of the risk management function.' 5 '
In recognition of the potential conflicts of interest inhering in an internal
models approach, the MRA required that internal models be subject to
backtesting and that unfavorable test results would result in a higher safety
factor multiplier (the base multiplier was, as noted above, three).'5 2 If the
results of the backtesting indicate that the internal model's measurement of
VaR did not correspond with actual daily profit and loss data (or "trading
outcomes," as the MRA puts it), a penalty multiplier would apply to the
VaR depending on the extent of the disjoint between VaR and actual loss.
The MRA provides that the aim of the backtesting regime is to
"incorporate suitable incentives" into the internal models approach, but the
nature of the backtesting exercise is that it is retrospective and not
anticipatory. The Basel Committee notably did not require that a model
ensure capital adequacy in light of hypothetical future adverse scenarios or
stress tests.
In 2005, the Basel Committee issued joint guidance with IOSCO to
revise the MRA to address the burgeoning credit risk that was building up
in banks' trading books through an explosion in the trading of collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs), credit default swaps (CDSs) and other structured
and illiquid products.'53 These amendments also aimed to reduce capital
arbitrage opportunities. As bank trading books burgeoned and average
151. 1996 MARKET RISK AMENDMENTS, supra note 146, at 39-41.
152. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL
ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 41 (2005),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs1 19.pdPnoframes=1 [hereinafter 2005 MRA
AMENDMENTS]; BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR
THE USE OF "BACKTESTING" IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INTERNAL MODELS APPROACH
TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 1-2, 11-12 (1996) [hereinafter BACKTESTING
FRAMEWORK],.http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.pdnoframes= 1. Notably absent from
the Basel Committee reports, however, is a direct mention of conflicts of interest. Instead,
the Basel Committee focused on "incorporating suitable incentives into the internal models
approach[,]" though it appears from context that the Basel Committee was referring to
"continual improvement" of the models rather than the obvious moral hazard involved from
the delegation of responsibility. BACKTESTING FRAMEWORK, supra, at 1. U.S. banking
regulators adopted the backtesting methodology in nearly identical form to the Basel
Committee paper.
153. See Susan Schmidt Bies, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Address
at the Global Association of Risk Professionals Basel II Summit (Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bies20070226a.htm; see also Risk-Based
Capital Standards: Market Risk, 71 Fed. Reg. 55,958, 55,962 (Sept. 25, 2006) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 325) ("The objective of enhancing the risk sensitivity of the rule reflects the
growth in traded credit products, such as credit default swaps and tranches of collateralized
debt obligations, other structured products, and less liquid products.").
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asset holding periods shortened, opportunities for arbitrage abounded,
chiefly by way of banks classifying as trading positions certain assets that
properly belonged in the loan book (and accordingly carry a generally
higher capital charge). Under the 2005 amendments to the MRA, most
large banks 54 would be required to measure and hold capital against the
incremental default risk not captured in the bank's VaR models.' 55 In
particular, bank regulators considered the MRA's specification of a ten-day
trading holding period for a 9 9% confidence interval to be an unrealistic
assumption for VaR in connection with illiquid credit default swaps.156 As
was evident from the sudden collapse of AIG's CDS business in 2008, a
collapse in confidence with respect to an important CDS counterparty can
lead to a rapid evaporation of liquidity.157 Although the Basel Committee
insisted on an additional capital charge and ramped up the statistical
"confidence" of the measurement, the banks were again instructed to utilize
internal models to measure the relevant risks.158 Once again, we see in the
2005 amendments (1) a perception of a mismatch between extant capital
154. The Basel Accord only applies to "internationally active banks." See BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE
MARKET RISKS 1 (2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl19.pdpnoframes=l. In the
United States, the proposed rules will apply to all banks with worldwide consolidated trading
revenue equal to either (1) 10% of total assets or (2) $1 billion. See Risk-Based Capital
Standards: Market Risk, 71 Fed. Reg. at 55,960.
155. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE BASEL
II MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK 1 (2008), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl40.pdP
noframes= 1.
156. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 71 Fed. Reg. at 55,968. In
December 2007, the U.S. banking regulators had received comments on the market risk
amendments NPR and indicated a final rule would be promulgated. in the near future. See
Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-Basel II, 72 Fed.
Reg. 69,288, 69,289 n.2 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325). Nevertheless, to date
they have yet to adopt the 2005 amendments.
157. Robert O'HarrowJr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. PosT, Dec.
31, 2008, at Al. The incremental VaR would be measured with a one-year horizon and a
99.9% confidence interval (instead of the ten-day horizon and 9 9 % confidence interval
applicable under the 1996 MRA).
158. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 71 Fed. Reg. at 55,965 ("As under
the current market risk capital rule, a bank would be required to use one or more internal
models to calculate a daily VaR-based measure that reflects general market risk for all
covered positions."); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE APPLICATION OF BASEL
II To TRADING ACTIVITIES AND THE TREATMENT OF DOUBLE DEFAULT EFFECTS 67 (2005),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl 16.pdPnoframes=1. Banks are also free to calculate their
incremental credit risk capital charge by reference to a surcharge through an approach
consistent with its approach for calculating credit risk in its Basel II risk-based capital
internal model. If such a "surcharge" is applied, the bank can insulate itself from the
backtesting requirement altogether. See 2005 MRA AMENDMENTS, supra note 152, at 47.
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regulation and the risks to which banks were actually subjecting their asset
portfolios and (2) a resolution to delegate the measurement of that risk to
the regulated banks.
c. Basel II Pillars 1 and 3: Internaly Modeling Credit and Operational Risks
and Public Disclosure
Shortly after the Basel Committee had finalized the market risk-focused
1996 MRA, it commenced a reevaluation of the Basel Accord's treatment
of credit risk. Aside from a few amendments to tidy up unresolved issues in
the Basel Accord, the credit risk regime had remained largely static
throughout the 1 990s.159 Bank supervisors were faced with an increasingly
dynamic risk profile of banks and the need to anticipate new sources of
vulnerability and uncertainty (of both the known and unknown variety),
which "require[d] trying to understand how changing institutions,
products, markets, and trading strategies create vulnerabilities to new kinds
of shocks and new channels of contagion."l 60 Among the measures that
intrigued the Basel Committee was the incorporation of internal credit risk
models, which had advanced considerably in the 1990s, into the capital
adequacy regulatory context. The Basel Committee circulated a draft
proposal to members and regulated banks in June 1999, and presented an
agreed text five years later in June 2004 (Basel II).161 The Basel II reforms
significantly retool bank capital adequacy regulation. Basel II comprises
three "pillars": Pillar 1 specifies the minimum capital requirements for
credit risk and operational risk; Pillar 2 concerns the supervisory review
process; and Pillar 3 sets forth new market disclosure requirements
intended to enhance market discipline alongside regulation and supervision.
159. Amendments included (i) a 1991 amendment resolving a lacuna in the Basel
Accord by setting of a 1.25% ceiling (or 2% in exceptional circumstances) for the extent to
which banks could count general provisions or general loan loss reserves as Tier 2 capital; (ii)
1994 amendments facilitating the netting of obligations from a single counterparty; and (iii)
1994 amendments to address perceived risks with preferential risk weighting of OECD
government-issued debt subsequent to the entry of Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey in the
OECD. See DUNCAN WOOD, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING 124-25 (2005).
160. Herring, supra note 59, at 396.
161. While increasing the risk sensitivity of the initial Basel Accord was the impetus
behind the Basel II reform, I do not mean to give the impression that the members of the
Basel Committee were pursuing this goal as enlightened philosopher kings. The agenda of
the multi-year reform effort was driven in part by massive lobbying expenditures of large
internationally active banks, which stood to gain from the internal models approach
competitive advantages vis-a-vis their regional competitors. This story, while important for
context, is outside the scope of this Article, which examines the internal models approach as
it is in order to gauge its merits and demerits as a new governance technology.
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i. Pillar 1: Capital Requirements and Internal Models
Pillar 1 allows banks to compute their regulatory capital requirements
against credit risk in two ways: (1) a revised standardized approach based
on the initial Basel Accord, or (2) one of two versions of an "internal ratings
based" (IRB) approach whereby banks are permitted to develop and use
their own internal risk ratings.162  The IRB approaches permit banks
meeting certain qualitative and quantitative criterial 63 to set their capital
requirements by reference to inputs from their own internal VaR models
rather than the Basel Accord's multipliers. In the United States, bank
regulators have mandated the use of the IRB for banks with either
consolidated total assets of at least $250 billion or consolidated on-balance
sheet exposure of at least $10 billion.164
Specifically, there are two IR-B approaches: the foundation approach
(FA) and the advanced approach (AA). Both approaches require banks to
categorize their assets according to five categories (sovereign, bank,
corporate, retail, and equity).' 65 The IRB approaches are based on four
key input parameters: (1) the probability of default (PD); (2) the loss given
default (LGD); (3) the exposure at default (EAD); and (4) effective maturity
(M). PD represents the "long-run average of one-year default rate" for a
given borrower.166 LGD measures the anticipated loss, expressed as a
percentage, of a total exposure upon the occurrence of a default.167 EAD
measures the total exposure if a default occurred, expressed as an amount.
Basel II sets forth elaborate asset class-specific computational formulae to
be used in calculating the capital requirements based on whether a group is
162. The revised standardized approach further disaggregates the five risk-weighting
categories of the Basel Accord, thereby heightening the risk sensitivity of the standardized
capital adequacy requirements. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDs-A REVISED
FRAMEWORK (COMPREHENSIVE VERSION) 19-51 (2006),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdPnoframes=1 [hereinafter BASEL II DOCUMENT]
(expanding risk weight categories to include, among others, a 3 5% risk weights for claims
secured by residential real estate and 150% risk weights for claims on corporate rated below
BB- by Standard & Poors). Basel II also includes provisions to take account of credit risk
mitigation in the form of credit default swaps, financial guarantees and collateralization of
claims. See id. at 3 1-51.
163. See id. at 88-120.
164. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-Basel
II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,298 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325). Banks
qualifying for IRB are also required to adopt the AMA for operational risk purposes. See
infra note 174 and accompanying text.
165. BASEL II DOcUMENT, supra note 162, at 52.
166. Id. at 99.
167. A standardized definition of default is provided in paragraph 452. Id. at 100.
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using AA or FA. Thus, the applicable formula differs between, e.g., an FA
bank's sovereign exposures and an AA bank's sovereign exposures, or
between an FA bank's equity exposures and the same FA bank's corporate
exposures. 168
The formulae include some combination of the input parameters.
Generally, the FA formulae utilize internal models for PD estimates but not
for LGD, EAD, and M estimates.169 The AA formulae utilize all internally
modeled estimates.170 As a result, the derivation of the capital requirement
for a given class of assets is dependant on internally generated estimates of
the input parameters. These input parameters are the same as, or are very
similar to, the inputs used in the VaR economic capital models that large
groups have been using since the 1990s.11' It is important to point out that,
unlike the capital models used in the MRA, banks' internal credit risk
economic models are not actually used in setting the regulatory capital
level, though they share common inputs. Instead, the common inputs are
inserted into the formulae set out in the Basel II documents. So the Basel
Committee trusts banks about credit, but not as much as they trust banks
about trading markets; embedded in the Basel formulae are particular
assumptions about the underlying drivers of portfolio credit risk, including
loss correlations. 72
Basel II also includes for the first time a mandatory charge against
"operational risk," which was defined as the "risk of loss resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external
events." 73 Under the advanced measurement approach (AMA), groups
may "use their own risk metrics for calculating the operational risk capital
requirement, including loss data, scenario analysis, and risk mitigation
168. There is an inertial aspect to the implementation of IRB to asset classes: any group
using IRB for one or more asset classes (e.g., sovereign, bank) is required eventually to
extend IRB treatment to all asset classes, and a group may not return to the standardized
approach once initiating IRB. Id. at 61-62. Moreover, the enhanced flexibility to measure
LCD and EAD provides a significant incentive for groups to migrate from FA to AA. See Til
Schuermann, What Do We Know About Loss Given Default? 3 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Center,
Working Paper Series No. 04-01, 2004), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/
fic/papers/04/040 1.pdf.
169. Technically, M is "calculated" internally rather than estimated. BASEL II
DOCUMENT, supra note 152, at 60.
170. Id. at 59.
171. See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,291 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325) ("The
[IRB] framework is based on 'value-at-risk'(VaR) modeling techniques that measure credit
risk and operational risk.").
172. Id. at 69,292; TARULLO, supra note 14, at 155-59.
173. BASEL II DOCUMENT, supra note 152, at 144.
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measures."1 74 Like the IRB approaches to credit risks and the MRA for
market risks, AMA eligibility is conditioned on meeting certain criteria.1 5
ii. Pillar 3: "Market Discipline" Through (Some) Disclosure of Proprietay
Information
With Pillar 3, the Basel Committee seeks to foster "market discipline" by
requiring banks to make public, unaudited disclosures of certain qualitative
and quantitative information about their regulatory capital positions, risk
management infrastructure, and risk positions.7 6 In keeping with the Basel
II theme, the disclosures are designed to "be consistent with how senior
management and the board of directors assess and manage the risks of the
bank.""' Pursuant to Pillar 3, the top consolidated entity within a banking
group must disclose information relating to its capital structure, regulatory
capital requirements, risk exposures and risk management processes with
respect to credit, market, interest, operational, and equity risks.78 All
disclosures under Pillar 3 are subject to a materiality qualification.17 9
Groups using the IRB approach for credit risk must disclose quantitative
details regarding the inputs used in the models (i.e., PD, LGD, EAD, M)
and the backtested performance of the models. The time horizon for the
required backtesting is unspecified, though the Basel Committee "expect[s]
that banks would provide these disclosures for as long [a] run of data as
possible." 80 The general characteristics of the internal models used by
banks calculating the market risk AMA capital charge must similarly be
described, and disclosures are to be made regarding the stress testing and
backtesting that, as discussed above, must be applied to the portfolio.' 8'
Groups using the AMA to set operational risk capital charges must provide
a description of the AMA, including a "discussion of relevant internal and
external factors considered in the bank's measurement approach." 82
Additionally, qualitative disclosure regarding certain assumptions of the
IRB credit risk internal models is required.183 With respect to these models,
disclosure must be made of "[t]he definitions, methods and data for
estimation and validation of PD, and ... LGD and/or EAD, including
174. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARiz. L. REv. 127, 138 (2009).
175. See BASEL II DOCUMENT, supra note 152, at 149-52.
176. See id. at 226.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 231-42.
179. Id. at 227.
180. Id. at 236 n.214.
181. Id. at 241.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 235.
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assumptions employed in these variables." 84 However, the disclosure
"does not require a detailed description of the model in full-it should
provide the reader with a broad overview of the model approach,
describing definitions of the variables, and methods for estimating and
validating" the model inputs. 85
III. BROKER-DEALERS AND THE CSE PROGRAM
In 2004, the SEC invited the largest U.S. broker-dealers to adopt an
internal models approach to capital adequacy regulation in the style of
Basel II under its Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Program. From
1975 until 2004, all U.S. broker-dealers were subject to the so-called
"uniform net capital rule" as Rule 15c3-1, which operated as a check on
the proprietary trading activities of registered broker-dealers.186 The net
capital rule gauges the adequacy of a broker-dealer's capitalization by
reference to availability of liquid assets to satisfy the obligations of its
customers. Specifically, firms must elect either to "(a) maintain aggregate
indebtedness at a level" not in excess of "fifteen times net capital" (the
"basic test") or "(b) maintain minimum net capital equal to not less than
two percent of 'aggregate debit items'" 8 7 (the "alternative test").188 When
considering the regulatory purpose behind the net capital rule, most
commentators have focused on the protection of customers and creditors
from losses and delays that might arise when a broker-dealer fails, and the
related protection of the SIPC insurance of customer accounts,189 though
there is, as with banks, a systemic risk minimization rationale as well.
Both the basic and the alternative net capital ratio tests first require a
calculation of net capital, which is really a regulatory assessment of the
liquid capital available for prompt distribution in the event of liquidation.
184. Id.
185. Id. at n.207.
186. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, BROKER DEALER
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 521-33 (2003). Industry firms were subject to some
form of capital regulation since enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In 1942,
the SEC promulgated the precursor to Rule 15c3-1, but exempted from its purview firms
that were members of stock exchanges with similar capital adequacy regulation, such as the
NYSE's Rule 325. In response to the industry's "paperwork crisis" in the late 1960s and a
rash of insolvencies of U.S. broker-dealers, Congress and the SEC parried proposals and
guidance for capital regulation that eventually resulted in Rule 15c3-1 in 1975.
187. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hilary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasuy Have a
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 739 (2009). "Aggregate debit items" is a measure of assets
that takes into account the "haircuts" discussed below to reflect illiquidity. See id. n.86.
188. Id. n.86.
189. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, 147zy the SEC Failed: Regulators against Regulation, 3 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & CouM. L. 289, 297 (2009).
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To compute net capital, the broker-dealer starts with its GAAP assets and
subtracts its GAAP liabilities to yield a net-worth-based capital number.
Subordinated liabilities meeting certain criteria and deferred tax liabilities
are added back into capital and illiquid assets (such as fixed property and
exchange membership rights), intangible assets (such as goodwill), prepaid
assets (such as insurance premiums and rent) and unsecured receivables are
backed out to produce a "tentative net capital" number. Finally, a
prescribed percentage of the market value of each broker-dealer
proprietary position is subtracted from tentative net capital, based on the
perceived market and asset liquidity risks associated with that particular
position. These "haircuts" are essentially reserves that reflect the
expectation that in a liquidation scenario, the proceeds to be obtained from
liquidating securities are subject to adverse price movements. Proprietary
assets that are less liquid or more volatile carry higher haircut percentages,
which reduces the capital number more than, for example, Treasury bills
(which carry a 0 % haircut). These haircuts are aggregated and subtracted
from the capital number to yield a final "net capital" amount that is
compared to aggregate indebtedness (under the basic test) or aggregate
debit items (under the alternative test). A firm with inadequate net capital
may not open its doors for business until it corrects the capital shortfall.
The haircut feature of the net capital rule is analogous to the initial Basel
Accord's risk-weighting regime.
It should be pointed out that both the basic and alternative variants of
the net capital rule, like the IBA, incorporated only the most rudimentary
risk sensitivities. In 1997 and 2002, the SEC and the CFTC, respectively,
approved the use of private third-party statistical option-pricing models to
set capital charges for certain options and futures contracts. In doing so,
the SEC emphasized that statistical modeling techniques were capable of
assessing risks and evaluating correlation of asset prices with greater detail
and sensitivity than the rigid haircut regime that had formerly been in
place. Under this new system, third-party vendors would be approved by
the applicable self-regulatory organizations (e.g., NYSE or NASD) and
would provide to the broker-dealers, for a fee, results of option pricing
models that aimed to estimate potential loss on options. The highest
amount of loss at any particular valuation point would be the charge to net
capital.o9 0 The SEC therefore sought to leverage the expertise of industry
to better synchronize risk and capital, much in the same way the SEC had
pegged capital charge haircuts for nonconvertible debt securities to
190. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RiSK-BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND




"nationally recognized statistical rating organizations" in 1975.191 Other
than the option pricing models, the net capital rule went largely
undisturbed from 1982 until 2004.192
By October 2008, each the five major independent broker-dealer
institutions-Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley-had undergone a massive and rapidly
cascading liquidity crisis and been liquidated or, at the behest of the
Federal Reserve, either converted to a financial holding company or been
acquired in a shotgun wedding-style transaction. How had the liquidity-
minded net capital rule failed to preserve the ability of these institutions to
meet their obligations in due course? The answer is simple: since 2004,
none of these institutions had been bound by the net capital rule and were
instead subject to the CSE Program internal models regime that set no
ceiling on leverage. In fact, all five institutions were operating by February
2008 with gross leverage ratios of approximately thirty times net capital.193
Professors John Coffee and Hillary Sale have documented the
connection between the E.U. Financial Conglomerates Directive (FCD)194
and the CSE Program.195  U.S. investment banks, desirous to avoid
submitting to consolidated regulation in the E.U. (including requirements
regarding internal controls, capital adequacy, intragroup transactions, and
risk concentration) in addition to U.S. regulation, brought pressure on the
SEC to regulate the broker-dealers in a substantially equivalent manner, so
191. See Erik R. Sirri, Div. Dir. of Trading & Mkts., Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Speech by
SEC Staff: Proposed Amendments Relating to References to Ratings of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (June 25, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch062508ers-2.htm.
192. See Lee A. Pickard, SEC's Old Capital Approach Was Tried-and True, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 8, 2008, at 10, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173-156/-359 703-
1.html; see also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 47 Fed. Reg. 3517 (Jan.
25, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
193. See Mewling and Puking, EcONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2008, at 89-90; OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REPORT No. 446-A, SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND
RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM (2008)
[hereinafter CSE-BEAR STEARNS REPORT]. Taking into account off-balance sheet
exposures, the leverage ratios were considerably higher. See Testimony Before the Financial Crisis
Inquiy Commission Hearing on the Financial Crisis, app. A, (2010) (statement of J. Kyle Bass,
Managing Partner, Hayman Advisors, L.P.), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/
pdfs/2010-0113-Bass.pdf (as of year-end FY 2007, reporting the following leverage ratios:
Morgan Stanley 44.3, Lehman 52.3, Bear Stearns 38.1, Goldman 36.8).
194. Council Directive 2002/87, 2003 OJ. (L 35) 1 (EC). Major U.S. commercial
banks were exempted from the operation of the FCD because they were subject to
"equivalent" supervision in the United States in the form of group-level supervision by the
Federal Reserve. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 187, at 738.
195. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 187, at 737-38.
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as to fall within the FCD exemption for financial groups operating under
equivalent supervisory standards. In 2004, the SEC offered to these
broker-dealers the option of opting out of the net capital rule system and
entering the new CSE regulatory regime of consolidated groups.196 Under
the CSE Program, broker-dealers with at least $5 billion of capital would
be permitted to avoid the net capital rule entirely, and instead subject
themselves to an alternative net capital program resembling Basel II.197 A
qualifying broker-dealer could become a CSE by applying for an
exemption from the SEC standard net capital rule.198 CSE groups would
have to "[c] alculate a group-wide capital adequacy measure consistent with
the international standards adopted by the Basel Committee" and
"maintain an overall ... capital ratio of not less than the Federal Reserve's
10 percent 'well-capitalized' standard for bank holding companies."99
Firms were to maintain tentative net capital at a level above $1 billion and
net capital above $500 million at all times.200
As discussed in detail in Part II.B.3.c, the Basel II framework relies on
the regulated firm to determine its own required capital levels based on
inputs derived from internal models. Intriguingly, federal bank regulators
proceeded very cautiously with the implementation of Basel II guidelines in
the United States. The same banking regulators that participated in the
creation of the guidelines were careful to ensure they were not applied too
hastily domestically. The SEC, by contrast, pushed through the CSE
Program in a matter of months.201 These risk models purported to gauge
the market risks that by September 2008 had materialized and evaporated
196. See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities; Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, 69 Fed.
Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Technically, Citigroup and
JPMorgan Chase were CSEs under the CSE Program, but the SEC did not exercise direct
oversight over these institutions, which were separately overseen by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve. See CSE-BEAR STEARNS REPORT, supra note 193, at v.
197. See Pickard, supra note 192, at 10 (lauding the track record of the net capital rule
and lamenting the transition to the CSE Program regime).
198. See Commodity and Security Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2005).
199. Examining the Regulation and Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 8 app. A (2007) (statement of Marc E.
Lackritz, President and CEO, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass'n); CSE-BEAR STEARNS
REPORT, supra note 193, at 10-11.
200. See CSE-BEAR STEARNS REPORT, supra note 193, at 11.
201. The SEC proposed the revisions to Rule 15c3-1 in November of 2003. See
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,872 (Nov. 6, 2003). By June 2004, the SEC had
adopted the revisions as final rules. See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-
Dealers that are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities: Supervised Investment Bank
Holding Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 34,428.
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any real capital cushion, requiring the provision of over $12 trillion in
support in the form of financial guarantees, capital injections, asset
purchases, and emergency liquidity assistance by the U.S. government and
the Federal Reserve. 202 And yet at the time of the Bear Stearns implosion,
each of the major U.S. investment banks was sufficiently capitalized under
the CSE Basel II program,203 according to its own VaR assessments. 204
The capital market, however, was telling a different story; Bear Stearns
lacked access even to secured funding. 205
The deregulatory effects of the CSE Program naturally raise the question
of capture: was the SEC captured by the powerful investment banks that
saw capital requirements as antiquated relics of a financial era before
financial innovation had minimized costs of financial distress normally
associated with leverage? It should go without saying that the investment
banking industry and their well-placed alumni lobbied aggressively for
abrogation of the net capital rule. 206 The tight-knit and centralized group
of the five largest investment banks might be expected to overcome the
free-riding problem normally incident to legislative or regulatory change. 207
The decentralized and dispersed groups of smaller broker-dealers (who
would encounter a higher cost of capital vis-A-vis the largest investment
202. Adding Up the Government's Total Bailout Tab, N.Y.TIMES.cOM, Feb. 4, 2009, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-
graphic.html.
203. See Testimony Concerning Recent Events in Credit Markets: Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission)), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/
ts040308cc.htm (testifying on behalf of the SEC regarding the March 2008 Bear Steams
collapse).
204. Cf Fanto, supra note 73, at 742 ("Mf financial institutions underestimate loss
probability, they will not have adequate capital in extreme circumstances.").
205. Id.
206. See Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From
Market Fundamentalism to a New Kynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 369, 384
(2009) ("[In 2003 and 2004, the biggest Wall Street investment banks, led by Henry
Paulson, then the head of Goldman Sachs, lobbied the [SEC] and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board for a number of key regulatory changes. The SEC commissioners
unanimously granted the banks an exemption from the net capital rule .... ); Stephen
Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile up New Debt, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al; Kevin
Drawbaugh, US. SEC Clears New Net-Capital Rules for Brokerages, REUTERS NEWS, April 28,
2004, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2004/200 4 0 4 28-
Headline08_Drawbaugh.htm ("Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman
Brothers and Bear Steams have expressed keen interest in CSE status .... .").
207. Cf MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIc GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-3 (1965) (theorizing that small and concentrated interest
groups may overcome free-riding problems that normally frustrate interest groups' efforts to
procure favorable legislation and regulatory policy).
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banks) and the brokerage customers (who would lose the benefits of the
inherent conservatism of higher capital charges applicable to their
custodians) would arguably navigate the free-rider problem with greater
difficulty. The five major investment banks constituted a group small
enough that dropping out would be difficult, and the costs of abrogating the
net capital rule could be spread among smaller competitors and industry
customers.
While this basic Olsonian account is in some respects accurate, it is not a
complete account of the CSE Program. Two other interrelated factors,
familiar to the discussion above regarding Basel II, must be taken into
account. Firstly, regulators perceived-not without good reason-that the
increasing complexity of the investment banking and broker-dealer
business rendered the formulaic approach of the net capital rule
inadequately responsive to the risks underlying and affecting these
regulated businesses. With each round of financial innovation, the
correlation between the haircut formulae and the real risks underlying
financial assets became increasingly arbitrary. Moreover, as risk
disintermediation increases, the risk correlation among a firm's positions is
rendered more opaque. Secondly, the acculturation of financial regulators
relying on leveraging private sector expertise in capital regulation-what
Professor Geoffrey Miller has aptly termed, in a slightly different context,
the "Basel Brand" 20 8-played a significant role in the SEC's CSE initiative.
The SEC borrowed the Federal Reserve's Basel II method of calculating
capital requirements for bank holding companies and applied them to the
new consolidated supervised entities. 209 In a sense, convergence of capital
regulation among investment banking and commercial banking groups
made eminently good sense; after all, in the years following passage of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, global financial conglomerates came to
dominate global lending and investment banking activities. 210 If the two
categories were collapsing into one, it made little sense to regulators to
regulate them according to disparate logics.
IV. INSURANCE COMPANIES & SOLVENCY 11
Insurance companies, like banks, must deal with an inherent asset-
liability mismatch. In the case of insurance companies, though, the
problem is the mirror image of the banking mismatch: an insurance
208. John D. Morley & Roberta Romano, The Future of Financial Regulation 101 (John M.
Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub. Pol'y, Research Paper No. 386, 2009).
209. See CSE BEAR STEARNS REPORT, supra note 193, at 10-11.
210. See Wilmarth, supra note 82, at 972-74 (discussing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's
effect on the U.S. financial services industry both domestically and abroad).
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company funds long-term future liabilities (i.e., policy claims) with a regular
stream of premium income (i.e., short-term assets). Government-
administered insurance guarantee funds support policyholders in the event
a firm is insolvent. Insurance regulators therefore tightly regulate capital
adequacy; it is, along with consumer protection, their chief regulatory
objective. The European Union is poised to reform its insurance industry
capital adequacy framework by instituting the so-called Solvency II
framework. As proposed, Solvency II will allow firms to use internal
market and credit risk models as the basis on which regulatory capital levels
are established.
V. INTERNAL CAPITAL MODELS APPROACH AS NEW GOVERNANCE
For the most part, financial regulatory scholarship has not yet
appreciated the important insights of new governance theory and its
applicability to dynamic, complex financial markets implicating a wide
range of public policy interests. Part V will (1) summarize new governance
theory, providing illustrative examples where it is put to practical use and
discussing its connections to and disjunctions from the familiar rules-
principles debate; (2) describe how the internal models approach to capital
regulation can be considered, in certain respects, a new governance
regulatory technique; and (3) characterize the shortcomings of the internal
models approach as falling within familiar traps that affect new governance
reforms, and conclude that Pillar 3's disclosure regime fails to redress these
traps adequately.
A. What Is New Govemance?
New governance refers to a wide range of administrative governance
techniques and tools that differ in important ways from traditional top-
down, command-and-control regulation. In particular, new governance
scholarship highlights the increasing involvement of nonstate actors in the
governance tools that shape and constitute public policy and regulation.
The description of new governance techniques as tools is not accidental;
their relation to policy objectives is instrumental rather than rival.21' New
211. See LESTER M. SAI-AMON, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 1, 8-9 (Lester M. Salarnon ed., 2002) (advocating a shift in the "unit of
analysis" of public administrative study from public agencies to the tools and instruments of
public administration); see also On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral
Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2131-32 (2009) (arguing that the
ends and means of public policy are "inevitably intertwined," and that new governance
"unabashedly recognizes" that the choice of tools in public policymaking is therefore
inherently normative); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L.
836 [62:3
20101 IJRElRvALMODElsAPPROACH TO CAPITALADEQUAcrREGULATION
governance scholarship is ambitious in its scope, and it touches on a wide
spectrum of the realms of public administration, from nursing home care,
Medicare and Medicaid service delivery, workplace safety, and
employment to crop insurance and endangered species conservation.
Despite the ambition of new governance, comparatively little has been
written to situate financial regulation reforms in the new governance
context.
The units of inquiry according to the traditional conception of regulation
are hierarchically-ordered administrative agencies, in possession of unique
expertise, to which the legislature has granted discretion to pursue
statutorily defined regulatory objectives.212  To the extent private
involvement is contemplated, it is usually framed as a threat to proper
administrative process. Public choice theorists have called into question
administrative discretion itself, emphasizing the pervasiveness of strategic
manipulation in public administration, and describing policy choices as a
product of pressure on the part of discrete, well-organized private actors.2 13
REV. 498, 502 (2004) ("In their willingness to synthesize an emerging social vision,
progressive reformers can move beyond entrenched and failed government structures while
resisting flat attacks on the affirmative state."); Symposium, The Changing Shape of Government,
28 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 1319, 1334 (2001) (remarks by Lester M. Salamon). By conflating
the means and ends of public regulation, Lobel recalls the expressly pragmatic
"experimentalist" strain of new governance scholarship. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 284-86 (1998)
(citing Pierce, Dewey, and Mead and invoking the "reciprocal determination of means and
ends" as a guiding principle behind their project of "organizing decentralized, collaborative
design and development under conditions of volatility and diversity"); see also id. at 302
("Think of the new institutions as pragmatist in that they systematically provoke doubt, in
the pragmatist sense of an urgent suspicion that habitual beliefs are poor guides to current
problems.").
212. SeeJAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 44 (1978) ("The New Deal believed in experts. Those who
rationalized its regulatory initiatives regarded expertise and specialization as the particular
strengths of the administrative process."); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1997) (discussing the strengths of
the administrative process, particularly expertise and specialization).
213. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative
Law, 98 YALE LJ. 341, 344-47 (1988); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 14-17 (1984)
(advocating that judges adopt an approach to statutory interpretation that seeks to enforce
the intent of bargains among private actors embodied in legislation); cf William N. Eskridge,
Implications of Public Choice Theof for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 285 (1988) ("Public
choice theorists typically treat legislation as an economic transaction in which interest groups
form the demand side, and legislators form the supply side."). See generally Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983)
(presenting a theory of private competition for political influence).
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Still others focus on accountability: how to protect the integrity and
expertise of the public administrative apparatus from narrowly self-
interested, private-interested parties. 214
Each of these accounts relies on a conceptual division between public
policymakers and private nonstate actors. As Professor Jody Freeman has
put it, they rely on "the illusion of a public realm"-that is, that there exists
a purely public sphere of activity.2 15 Even public choice theory buys into
this illusion, to the extent it advocates a normative deregulatory position;
there is a cross-pollination of private and public realms, but only because
the former is seeking to capture the latter. New governance theory posits
that this traditional conception is outdated as a descriptive matter, and that,
as a normative matter, in many contexts it is unlikely to conduce to
favorable regulatory outcomes. Instead, it is better to evaluate the
effectiveness of governance by reference to the tools through which
governance is effectuated, rather than by reference to the dramatis personae of
the regulator-regulatee game. As such, new governance scholars tend to
focus their analysis on the new modes of interaction between state and
nonstate actors. New governance, as a dynamic toolset rather than an ex
ante ideal distribution of administrative power, is therefore analytically
different than traditional accounts of administrative law discussed above. It
can coexist with traditional administrative activity, either as a rival or a
complement, and it can, though it need not, lead to wholesale
transformation of old governance into new governance. 2 16  New
governance tools aim to respond to the continual changes of regulated
society and knowledge itself, so "all solutions [to problems] should be
regarded as provisional."2 17
New governance programs and tools assume different forms, and often
include clusters of the following characteristics: increased participation of
and power sharing with nonstate actors; public adoption of rules negotiated
by nonstate stakeholders; encouragement of experimentation; promotion of
competition and diversity as a structural element of regulation; dynamic,
flexible, and dialogic lawmaking process as a response to dynamism of
regulated markets; multilevel functional integration and network-seeking
among branches, departments, agencies of government, and among state
214. SeeJody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv.
1, 13 (1997) (describing this position as a "conceptual limitation" that inhibits more effective
governance reform proposals).
215. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 564
(2000).
216. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivaly and Transformation, 13 CoLUM.J. EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007).
217. Id.
838 [62:3
2010] LN-TERVALMODELSAPPROACH TO CAPITALADEQUACREGUL4TON
and nonstate actors, and within regulatee firms; active pursuit of nonstate
actor knowledge to supplement-and sometimes replace-public
administrative expertise; promotion of subsidiarity; use of flexible, revisable
rules and standards; use of broad framework agreements; use of
benchmarks, indicators, and peer review to ensure accountability; and
fostering of deliberation among stakeholders over the nature of problems
and methods by which to solve them.
Of course, no new governance tool draws on all of these attributes. New
governance measures are at times highly formalized, and at other times
informal and consultative, consistent with "soft law" pronouncements. 218
The common thread running throughout new governance scholarship is
the deployment of novel techniques and tools in governance, usually
involving increased nonstate involvement, to overcome emergent or
intractable recurrent problems inhibiting the traditional command-and-
control regulatory model from achieving its regulatory objectives. This
Part discusses three of these characteristics in greater detail, since they are
most relevant to regulatory reform in dynamic and complex financial
markets, including Basel I's internal models approach: (1) retention of a
public role in lawmaking and enforcement; (2) active pursuit of nonstate
actor knowledge to supplement, and sometimes replace, public
administrative expertise; and (3) a dynamic, flexible, and dialogic
lawmaking process.
1. The Benign Big Gun: Retaining a Public Administrative Presence
The dominant account of new governance contemplates retention of
some formal public authority, even if it operates in the background. While
broader definitions of "governance" include a wider range of measures
impacting social and economic systems, 219 for purposes of this discussion
new governance must involve some element of public administrative
ordering. This precondition can be thought of as a jurisdictional
requirement; in other words, there is no ambiguity that the new governance
regulatory event is within the purview of at least one, and perhaps multiple,
218. Not all new governance initiatives are characterized by "softness," though softness
is often an indicium of new governance. At times, however, new governance measures are
characterized by a high degree of "hardness," especially the procedural orderings designed
to facilitate consensus-forming and power-sharing in the drafting of legislation and
regulation. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply: 'Wew Governance" in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 485-87 (2004).
219. See Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv. 1, 7-9 (2008) (highlighting the risk that governance risks
"becoming a point of false rhetorical convergence" and adopting an abstract definition of
"governance" as "'the management of the course of events in the social system').
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public administrative agencies. 220 By locating the regulatory event within
an administrative agency's jurisdiction, the new governance measure
enhances accountability and perhaps legitimacy as well. 221 The central
accountability challenge associated with new governance-namely, that
such measures vest substantial policy discretion in nonstate actors that are
not responsible for the results-is thus mitigated. In other words, the state
is not dead; it remains a critical juncture of new governance networks, just
not as an authoritative, directing regulator in a command-and-control
system. 222 By retaining a public element, new governance is also
distinguished from deregulation. The deregulatory political mood of the
1970s and 1980s resulted in significant deregulation of the trucking and
railroad industries, financial institutions, oil and gas prices, occupational
safety, and environmental protection. 223 Consider, for instance, the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which among other things
removed restrictions on thrift banks that had previously prevented them
from taking demand deposits and making commercial loans, lifted other
restrictions applicable to all depository institutions, and scheduled the
formal phase-out of all interest rate restrictions on demand deposits.224
With respect to each of these elements of the Act, the state dropped out of
the picture, except for its general supervisory competence to ensure the
"safety and soundness" of regulated banks and thrifts. The state decided
220. Cf David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000
U. ILL. L. REv. 35, 47 (2000) ("Thus, although it is true that contractarian regulation is a
reform alternative to command-and-control regulation, it is also true that command-and-
control regulation is a precondition for contractarian regulation.").
221. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 452-53 (2004) ("The retention of
supervisory authority and the background threat of direct regulation and enforcement
strengthen accountability in the shift to [the new] governance.").
222. See Adam Crawford, Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State? Steering Rowing
and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 449, 459
(2006) (discussing the continued importance of the state even to radical governance reforms,
seeing its importance "in its symbolic power and cultural authority; in its legitimacy claims
and public perceptions of its legitimacy; as a distinctive (tactical) resource and source of
information through which interests are pursued; [and] in its residual position as a back-up
of last resort with regard to other forms of control"); Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and
Sofi Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 137, 159-60 (2006) (describing the
state's role in new governance initiatives as "disaggregated" but "necessary").
223. The advances of public choice theory provided intellectual succor for the
deregulatory politics of the Carter-Reagan-George H.W. Bush presidencies. For some
public choice theorists, favorable regulatory outcomes were not achievable in the context of
public politics, so the state's proper role was a stage exit.
224. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1496 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 20 U.S.C. (2006)).
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that achievement of the regulatory objective was no longer worth pursuing,
and a private-market ordering of the thrift demand deposit markets
materialized quickly. Again, for purposes of this Article, and most new
governance scholarship, a purely private ordering will not be properly
categorized as a new governance tool.
By retaining residual command-and-control powers, regulators wield
what Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite have referred to as a benign big
gun.225 The background threat of the benign big gun, in the form of rarely
deployed but available severe sanctions, serves to incentivize regulated
market actors to avoid defecting from the regulatory objective. In this
respect, new governance excludes pure deregulatory initiatives and assumes
that some payoff, whether through the avoidance of stringent regulation or
a positive incentive to cooperate, exists for the regulated private-sector
actors in exchange for their participation in the governance initiative. The
new governance world, though, need not exclude self-regulatory regimes
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), provided
that there remains public supervision of the self-regulatory organization
(SRO).226 When the regulatory objective is best achieved through a
collaborative relation between public regulator and private regulatee rather
than a draconian set of sanctions accompanied by intrusive supervision, the
background threat of a benign big gun will be preferable.227 Importantly,
one need not adopt a rational actor model of behavior to accept the
theoretical superiority of a benign big gun model; the presence of the public
authority in the background can motivate socially responsible deliberation
in the foreground, in effect leveraging off of regulatees' pre-existing
commitments to, e.g., professional integrity or law-abidingness. 228
225. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19-53 (1992) (describing a benign big gun
approach to regulation that aims to appeal to the social responsibility of actors to obtain
voluntary compliance, but also stands ready to deploy deterrent threat sanctions of
increasing severity to motivate purely economically motivated "rational actors" and
incapacitate chronic law violators).
226. In the case of FINRA, the SEC must approve any issuance of, or modification to,
an SRO rule. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) & (2) (2006).
227. The concept of "penalty defaults" is analogous here. Contract law provides for
penalty defaults, in the form of background sanctions that no party is likely to prefer, to
induce contracting parties to engage in efficient contracting. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
97-98 (1989) (characterizing the common law rule that courts will enforce only contracts
with certain and definite terms as an incentive for contracting parties to make their
expectations express in the contract). The penalty default thus encourages responsible ex ante
contracting and deliberation rather than expost litigation. See id.
228. AYRES &BRAITHVAITE, supra note 225, at 47.
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2. Decentering Governance: Increased Power-Sharing and Stakeholder Participation
New governance measures often provide for actual power-sharing and
increased participation of nonstate actors in multiple stages of the
lawmaking process (legislation, rulemaking, implementation, enforcement).
By including more stakeholders in the process, policymaking is
decentralized and conceived "not as [a top-down ordering process] to be
done by autonomous regulators but rather as a process of mutual problem-
solving among stakeholders from government and the private sector. "229
The expertise and knowledge of private actors can be "harness[ed] .. . to
serve public goals," 230 and public lawmaking is oriented toward a
collaborative, consensus-seeking form of governance. 23 1 The actors might
remain the same, but the modes of interaction are no longer tethered to the
traditional administrative law paradigm. In this respect, new governance
differs from pluralistic accounts of governance that acknowledge an
important role for nonstate actor involvement, but never call into question
the exclusively public dimension of policymaking power and authority. 232
In new governance, there are multiple public and private legal entities, but
there is one public process.233
Increased participation and power-sharing allow for structuring
collaborative solutions to complex problems.234  Advantages to this
229. Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance
in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 5 (2002).
230. Freeman, supra note 215, at 549.
231. See Karkkainen, supra note 218, at 474 (referring to new governance as "consensus-
oriented").
232. See Freeman, supra note 215, at 559-60 (describing the pluralist "interest
representation" model of administrative law in which interest groups strive to advance their
perspectives in regulation and capture is checked by "democratizing" the regulatory process
to include numerous groups). A prominent example of pluralist participation is the right of
interested parties to provide comments to proposed rules under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §
553(c) (2006).
233. See Lobel, supra note 221, at 375 ("[T]he governance model offers a framework that
enables us to view the different sectors-state, market, and civil society-as part of one
comprehensive, interlocking system. The focus is on government interactions with private
actors in public action.").
234. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 211, at 315-23 (theorizing an experimentalist
governance regime of "directly deliberative polyarchy" in which "governance councils"
collaborate with local citizens and "pool their experience to inform their separate decisions"
to achieve "good government under conditions of volatility and diversity"); Michael A.
Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education
Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 99, 114-36 (1996) (elaborating a "community engagement
dialogic model" of school reform that seeks to build community consensus among teachers,
administrators, parents, and students in order to achieve better outcomes); Charles F. Sabel
& William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litgation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
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approach include reduced likelihood that regulatees will defect from a
mutually agreed upon policy solution because of its perceived legitimacy;
after all, they helped write it, and they agreed to it.235 Therefore, provided
appropriate stakeholders contribute to the process, enhanced participation
and power-sharing bolster legitimacy. Of perhaps even greater
importance, though, is the potential of negotiated regulatory deals to bridge
knowledge gaps between regulators and regulatees in exceedingly complex
regulated industries. As noted above in Part II.B.3.a.ii with respect to
banks, complexity can overwhelm administrative agencies, and often
regulatees are in possession of critical data and information. Since new
governance posits a collaborative, nonadversarial relationship between
regulator and regulatee, the latter will presumably be more inclined to
disclosure and forthrightness than to preservation of its interests at all costs
against public interference. A similar point may be made with respect to
third-party public interest groups, whose inclusion in a tripartite lawmaking
process will bring still further perspectives to the fore.236
For example, the European Union's Maastricht Treaty vests employers
and labor representatives with co-lawmaking powers pursuant to the "social
dialogue" lawmaking process. While traditional lawmaking in the
European Union proceeds exclusively from public authority, under the
"social dialogue," employers and pre-certified labor representatives can
negotiate generally applicable policy agreements governing labor relations,
workplace safety, vocational training, and other areas of E.U. "social
policy" that, upon Council approval, have binding force as directives under
REv. 1015, 1019-21, 1067-69, 1077-80 (2004) (advocating for the "destabilization" of
chronically underperforming public institutions to, among other things, induce participation
of wider array of stakeholders in decisionmaking processes).
235. According to socio-legal research, absent unusually high recourse to detection and
prosecution command-and-control techniques, regulatees are more likely to comply with
regulations that are perceived as legitimate. See AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 225, at
113 ("[C]onsiderable evidence indicates that participation in a decision-making process
increases the acceptance and improves the execution of the decisions reached."); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxey, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1817, 1818 (2007)
("[C]ompliance decisions are based at least as much on the perceived legitimacy of the law
and prevailing norms in local context as any deliberate risk calculation."); Orly Lobel,
Interlocking Regulatoy and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1071, 1089-91 (2005) (describing limited success of top-down, command-and-control
OSHA regulation in inducing compliance from firms); Scott & Trubek, supra note 229, at 8
(discussing the efforts of new governance to secure legitimacy and the effects legitimacy
concerns have on new governance design). See generally ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAw 3-7, 170-78 (1990) (analyzing the link between legitimacy and the perception of
governmental authority).
236. See infra Part V.B.
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E.U. law.237 Thus, nonstate stakeholders wield substantial power over the
direction of the lawmaking process, though public actors remain in the
process (the Commission initiates the discussion, and the Council ratifies
the negotiated agreement between the social partners). In the United
States, regulatory negotiation (or "reg-neg") has emerged as an alternative
to traditional Administrative Procedure Act (APA) administrative
rulemaking.238 In a reg-neg, either industry representatives or the agency
proposes formation of a committee pursuant to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. If the agency agrees to constitute a committee for a reg-
neg, stakeholders-including, unlike the E.U.'s social dialogue model, any
additional interested nonstate third parties-may petition the agency for
inclusion in the negotiations. The agency has discretion over which
interested parties are included in the process. At the conclusion of the
negotiation, if a consensus rule is achieved it is then channeled through the
normal notice and comment rulemaking process under the APA. In the
cases of reg-neg and E.U. social dialogue lawmaking, the public
involvement remains substantial, but nonstate actors contribute as
collaborative co-policymakers in reaching a negotiated governance
solution.239
Another example of a new governance tool involving increased
participation of nonstate actors is the use of Habitat Conservation Plans
(HCP) to permit "incidental takings" of wildlife. Pursuant to a 1982
amendment to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Congress permitted
237. Treaty on European Union arts. 1-4, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 91-2 (EC)
(requiring E.U. Commission to consult with, and providing the right to assume lawmaking
initiative via contractual negotiations to, "management and labour"); Communication
Concerning the Application of the Agreement on Social Policy Presented by the Commission to the Council and
to the European Parliament, at 4-5, 30 COM (1993) 600 final, Dec. 14, 1993 (certifying the
representative status of certain unions and employer associations and establishing criteria for
organizations to be consulted); see also Council Directive 1999/70, 1999 Oj. (L 175) 43 (EC)
(framework agreement on fixed term work); Council Directive 97/81, 1998 Oj. (L 14) 9
(EC) (framework agreement on part-time work). For more information on the E.U.'s social
dialogue lawmaking, see Jelle Visser, More Holes in the Bucket: Twenty rears of European Integration
and Organized Labor, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 477, 495-99 (2005).
238. For a summary of the reg-neg process, see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 87-94 (2001).
239. Professor Kimberly Krawiec's discussion of "negotiated governance" is illustrative
of this collaborative, contract-based conception of new governance. See Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q 487,
516-22 (2003). Krawiec is skeptical of negotiated governance initiatives inasmuch as they,
like all agreements, leave certain terms undefined. These negotiated agreements are
"incomplete contracts" that invite opportunistic behavior among parties-particularly
lawyers and compliance professionals-during renegotiation, which, in the regulatory
context, occurs during the implementation and enforcement stages. See id. at 521.
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businesses that would otherwise run afoul of the strict prohibition of
"takings" of any animal designated by U.S. regulators as an endangered
species to engage in "incidental takings" of endangered species if they
submitted a satisfactory HCP.240 An HCP must include commitments from
the applicant to mitigate damage and not appreciably reduce the likelihood
of survival and recovery of the species in the wild, but the plan design is still
largely left to the discretion of the applicant. After an HCP enters into
force, the supervision of the permit holder's compliance with the HCP may,
but need not necessarily, be delegated to a third-party intermediary with an
interest in policing compliance, such as a nonprofit conservationist
group.241 In place of the strict prohibition-which sets up a winner-take-all
political conflict between pro-growth and pro-conservationist camps-the
HCP alternative opens up the possibility that pro-growth and pro-
conservationist groups can participate in a collaborative process.
3. Flexible and Dynamic Law: Overcoming Rule-Principle Polarity
The end governance output of each negotiated regulatory deal is
generally an ex ante rule or principle. Moreover, these ex ante laws are often
generally applicable to all market participants without regard to the specific
circumstances of regulated firms. When regulating dynamic and complex
market behaviors, such ex ante laws will be either over- or under-inclusive,
and will often fail to achieve their objectives. Worse still, they might
unnecessarily exacerbate market complexity by motivating a regulatory
arbitrage game in which regulatees develop technologies to avoid the effects
of the ex ante law. Unless enforced simplicity is the favored solution, 242 the
challenge for lawmakers is to construct a regulatory system that is flexible
enough to keep up with the dynamism of these regulated activities.
Much of the scholarship and popular discourse concerning the need for
flexibility and dynamism in financial regulatory reform has occurred in the
context of the rules-principles debate. While the rules-principles divide
has already proven its substantial marketing value in jurisdictional
240. The amendments to the ESA permit takings that are "incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)
(2006). For a helpful background discussion of the genesis and mechanics of HCPs, see
Albert C. Lin, Participants' Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q 369, 371-81 (1996).
241. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the Restructuring of
Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q 692, 697 (1999) (noting a trend that
nonprofit organizations, such as the Nature Conservancy, are taking an increasingly active
role in monitoring HCPs).
242. This qualification is not trivial in the case of financial regulation. See supra notes 25-
27 and accompanying text.
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competition, 243 its meaning is notoriously inexact and it is never an accurate
description of an entire system. 244 In most cases, it is more sensible to
analyze regulatory reforms in dynamic financial markets according to a
new governance framework and ask if lawmaking technologies, whether
"based" in principles or rules, are being deployed effectively and in a
flexible manner.
Professor Larry Cunningham has described three ways in which the
rules-principles distinction is commonly understood. First, the analytical
distinction refers to a temporal division between rules, the content of which
is set out ex ante, and principles, the content of which is filled in ex post.
Second, the conceptual distinction refers to a distinction between
particularized, concrete rules and general, abstract principles. Third, the
functional distinction refers to principles, which repose discretion in
designated actors, and rules, which do not. All three ways of understanding
the divide resonate with new governance scholarship. In particular, the
analytical and conceptual rubrics shed light on the new governance
attribute of flexible and dynamic lawmaking.245
Professor Louis Kaplow has touched on the analytical and conceptual
rubrics, theorizing that precise rules are costly ex ante, as their content is the
result of an extensive deliberative or negotiated process. 246 Applying that
precept to the reg-neg and E.U. social dialogue processes discussed above
in Part V.A.2, it is unobjectionable. 247 On the other hand, general, abstract
principles are costly ex post, when the content of the law must be
implemented by regulators, interpreted by practitioners, and enforced by
adjudicatory authorities. According to Kaplow's formulation, it then
243. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based
Systems" in Corporate Lnaw, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1411, 1416,
1481-91 (2007).
244. See Cristie L. Ford, Princip1es-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial
Crisis, 55 McGILL LJ. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 9) (available at Social Science
Research Network) ("Rules and principles are also best understood as points on a continuum
rather than discrete concepts, and there is a good deal of overlap and convergence among
them.").
245. See Cunningham, supra note 243, at 1417, 1420. Cunningham ultimately eschews
the rules-principles distinction due to its unavoidable imprecision, and recommends that
legal scholars and policymakers "retire" its usage.
246. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557,
559-60 (1992).
247. There is some evidence that less time is required to fully deliberate on, and
negotiate, rules under the reg-neg process than traditional APA rulemaking. See Cornelius
M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theoy, 2 J. PUB.
ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 113, 124, 134 (1992). That said, it is certainly true that the time
and expense of producing an agreed-upon rule pursuant to reg-neg or a similar negotiated
lawmaking process exceeds the amounts expended to draft an open-ended principle.
846 [62:3
2010] INTER ALMODELSAPPROACH TO CAPITALADEQUACrREGUL4TION
follows that, given economies of scale, "the greater the frequency with
which a legal command will apply, the more desirable rules tend to be
relative to standards." 248 In other words, when a regulatory scenario is
likely to be frequently occurring (as with the "repeat player" regulator-
regulatee encounters in the financial industry), it is preferable to invest in
precise rulemaking upfront, rather than incur expenditures in frequent and
shifting reinterpretations of principles, the content of which is filled in ex
post.
Professor Cristie Ford elaborates on Kaplow, noting that the law drafter
might lack adequate information to draft ex ante rules governing frequently
applicable occurring transactions or events.249 Under such circumstances,
it is therefore preferable that the content of laws-or, more broadly, the
means and tools by which regulatory objectives are to be achieved-be
flexible and dynamic. 250 Therefore, synthesizing Kaplow and Ford, a
highly complex and high-frequency regulatory scenario characterized by
regulator-regulatee information gaps is susceptible to neither rules (because
of information asymmetries) nor principles (because of the frequently
recurring nature of the regulatory encounter), but more likely some mixture
of the two. From a new governance perspective, though, this theoretic
dilemma is easily remedied by focusing on the ways in which new tools,
whether they consist of rules or principles, will achieve regulatory objectives
in a flexible and dynamic market.
From a new governance perspective, it is more sensible to refer to many
so-called "principles-based" regulatory systems as flexible systems that are
open to diverse forms of articulation. 25 1 One way to retool governance in
these markets is to equip public administrative processes with structural
mechanisms to engage in continuous learning and revision, monitoring and
error detection, benchmarking, and peer review. An "experimentalist"
strain of new governance theorists has emphasized that solutions in new
governance regimes are provisional and should remain subject to constant
248. Kaplow, supra note 246, at 577.
249. Ford, supra note 4, at 36-37.
250. See Ford, supra note 244, at 9.
251. See Lobel, supra note 221, at 391. Julia Black proposes a "conversational model of
regulation" to remedy the inherent uncertainty, indeterminacy, and over- or under-
inclusiveness of regulatory rules and principles. See BLACK, supra note 23, at 37-44.
Professor Black notes that "[i]n conversation, the problems of generalizations and to an
extent of open texture can be, and are, resolved by explanation and latitude in interpretation
and understanding on the part of those participating." Id. at 38. A conversational model of
regulation raises accountability concerns that could be addressed by widening the
conversational constituency to include other affected parties. See id. at 42-43; cf Part V.B.
The participants in the conversation will then constitute the "interpretive community" that
collectively develop the content of regulation. See Black, supra note 23, at 37.
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revision in light of observed experience. The experimentalist scholars apply
insights from management theory and practice to public governance
dilemmas. 252 For example, the Lamfalussy rulemaking process governing
E.U. financial regulation rulemaking provides for mandatory four-year
sunset reviews of framework laws, which guarantees that the E.U.'s
lawmaking bodies revisit the assumptions of earlier laws.253 Moreover, the
Lamfalussy process requires the E.U. lawmaking authorities to consult
repeatedly with so-called Level 3 committees254 comprising financial
regulators from the member states.255 The Level 3 committees ensure
consistent implementation, supervision, and enforcement of the E.U.-level
rules by the member state regulators. One important new governance
aspect of the Level 3 committee role is a mandatory peer review of member
states' implementation efforts, which forces the committees to evaluate
implementation, share information, and even create ad hoc groups to
address specific shortcomings.25 6 In their composite, these peer review
interactions permit the identification, on a rolling basis, of best practices
and create a forum to exert moral suasion on underperforming member
states.257
252. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 211, at 286 ("The immediate instigation of our desig[n]
for democracy is a series of innovations by private firms that suggest institutional devices for
applying the basic principles of pragmatism to the master problem of organizing
decentralized, collaborative design and development under conditions of volatility and
diversity. The innovations, inspired by organizational breakthroughs in Japan, but no
longer limited to Japanese firms or those in close association with them, are a response to
markets that have become so differentiated and fast changing that prices can serve as only a
general framework and limit on decisionmaking."); Simon, supra note 4, at 6-11 (contrasting
the "static optimization" managerial perspective with a "reliability" perspective of managers
operating in dynamic industries that is more responsive to uncertainty and, therefore, a
better model for financial regulation).
253. See Elliot Posner, The Lamfalussy Process, Polyarchic Origins of Networked Financial Rule-
Making in the EU, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 43, 47-48
(Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010) (referring to the sunset clauses as "formal
recursive mechanism").
254. The three Level 3 committees are the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
(CEBS), the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
(CEIOPS), and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). See Commission
Decision 2009/77, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 18, 20 (EC), available at http://www.cesr-
eu.org/index.php?page=document.details&from tide=Documents&id=5548; Commission
Decision 2009/78, art. 1, 2009 OJ. (L 25) 23, 25 (EC), available at http://www.c-
ebs.org/Aboutus.aspx; Commission Decision 2009/79, art. 1, 2009 OJ. (L 25) 28, 30 (EC),
available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/aboutceiops/EC-Decision-2009-79-EC-
establising-CEIOPS.pdf.
255. See Posner, supra note 253, at 47.
256. See id. at 55.
257. Cf Dorf & Sabel, supra note 211, at 350-53 (theorizing a rolling best practice
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While Europe has been more creative in making use of experimentalist
best practice and continuous learning regimes in the financial regulatory
arena, U.S. regulators have recently demonstrated a greater openness to
these alternatives. For example, in October 2009 the Federal Reserve
announced a proposed supervisory initiative to conduct a horizontal review
of compensation practices of twenty-eight "large, complex banking
organizations" (LCBOs).258 The announcement listed several principles
that the Federal Reserve expects will guide LCBO compensation
practices. 259 The policies implemented by LCBOs in response to the listed
guiding principles will become subject to the ongoing safety and soundness
review by Federal Reserve personnel. 260 The Federal Reserve set forth a
broad set of principles and left the articulation of the specific policies to the
discretion of the LCBOs. As LCBO compensation practice evolves, the
Federal Reserve will be able to identify best practices and establish them as
benchmarks, and then press the lagging LCBOs during supervisor reviews
to update compensation in light of their more innovative competitors. 26 1
Here we see an oft-overlooked attribute of transparency: not only does it
enhance democratic legitimacy, it is also a learning device. 262 As firms and
regulators learn more on a rolling basis, the regulatory landscape can and
should adjust.
Another recent example of open articulation of law in'the financial arena
is the U.S. insurance regulators' move to a "principles-based reserving"
regime according to which life insurers will be able to estimate their
liabilities with respect to policy and annuity reserves based in part on
company specific experience and the results of internal stochastic models.263
environmental regime that would require firms to ramp up environmental standards to meet
the industry best practices, and explaining how such a regime would result in significant
innovation as market participants would aim to out-innovate competitors, which would be
saddled with additional expenses to ensure compliance with constantly evolving best practice
standards); id. at 345 ("The chief purposes of administrative agencies in democratic
experimentalism are . .. to set-again by a variation of benchmarking-regulatory
standards for market actors; and to undertake such changes in their own activities and
organization as cumulative self-scrutiny indicates will further these purposes.") .
258. Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg.
55,227, 55,229 (Oct. 27, 2009).
259. Id. at 55,232-38.
260. Id. at 55,238.
261. See id. ("The review is designed to ... [among other things, i]dentify emerging best
practices through comparison of practices across organizations and business lines.").
Additionally, the guidance itself is open-ended: the Federal Reserve commits to "update this
guidance as appropriate to incorporate best practices as they develop over time." Id.
262. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 234, at 1072 ("Transparency is both an
accountability norm and a learning device.").
263. See Elizabeth K. Brill et al., Modernization of U.S. Insurance Regulation: Principles-Based
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The Model Standard Valuation Law, some form of which is in effect in
nearly all U.S. states, is based on a legislative model that has not changed
for over 150 years. The "principles-based reserving" reform will allow the
valuation of liabilities to evolve with advances in mortality risk modeling
technology and in consideration of a firm's experience when reserving for
its own products.
B. Normative New Governance: Pro-Regulation, but Beware of Legitimacy Challenges
There is a normative pro-regulatory implication of new governance, and
its techniques are instrumental tools to be deployed to achieve legitimate
policy objectives. However, the tools of new governance pose significant
normative challenges for governance stakeholders. Lester Salamon has
referred to the "legitimacy challenge" 264 posed by new governance.
According to the traditional conception of regulation, there is a trade-off
between flexibility and legitimacy. 265 Increased private involvement in
governance risks blocking the channels through which democratic
legitimacy flows. Professor Orly Lobel describes the legitimacy challenge as
follows: "A ... challenge posed by the shift to a [new] governance model is
striking a balance between the value of direct participation and the need for
a high-quality representative democracy."2 66 We have seen above in Part
V.A. 1 how retention of a benign big gun presence reinforces legitimacy, but
what bulwarks protect the state from excessive influence by nonstate actors?
It is here in the discussion of legitimacy that the danger of capture arises: if
Reservingfor Life Insurers, 3 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON FIN. INST. REP. 1, 3-5 (2009).
264. See Salamon, supra note 211, at 38. Salamon also describes the "accountability
challenge" and the "management challenge." I read Salamon's legitimacy challenge as, at
bottom, a more radical version of the accountability challenge, as it goes to the compatibility
of the new governance regime with our current system of government. Cf Edward Rubin,
The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2073,
2121 n.138 (2005) (distinguishing between accountability--"the ability of one actor to
demand an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or
punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation"-and legitimacy,
which "refers to the acceptability of a political regime in its entirety"); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC
AccouNTABIUTY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 120-22 (Michael W.
Dowdle ed., 2006) (referring to legitimacy concerns, under Rubin's definition, as questions
of "legal accountability").
265. Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 837 (2000) ("[E]mergent experimentalist bodies . .. point
the way beyond a parallel dilemma that has long been taken to be a defining feature and
limit of bureaucratic administration, the conflict between accountability and the flexibility
required for effectiveness.").
266. Lobel, supra note 221, at 453.
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the administrative state can be captured under the traditional regulatory
model, should we be all the more cautious that regulatees will use new
governance as a Trojan Horse through which to achieve further agency
capture?
Regulators need to be concerned not only with direct capture, but also
with subtler, but related, threats to legitimacy. Professor Lobel describes
one such danger as the risk that a new governance measure, because of its
emphasis on ground-level information gathering from a larger array of
stakeholders, will internalize the "illusion of information and
transparency-that the information age, through its own mechanisms, can
solve all problems." 267 Lobel warns in particular against the dominion of
economic expertise, which, due in part to its putative quantifiability and
quasi-scientific qualities, might come to dominate a new governance
lawmaking process. The nonstate actors with the best access to, and the
greatest ability to process and present, information might be expected to
exert disproportionate influence over the information-based policymaking
process. 268 In reality, power, in both direct and hegemonic manifestations,
is inevitably enmeshed in decisions about which information to credit, and
how to organize information. The challenge, then, is to ensure that
substantive policy deliberation still occurs (thus ensuring a proper
democratic exercise of public power), and that the regulatory exercise is not
reduced to the stamping of a state imprimatur on policy prescriptions based
solely on data presented by particular interest groups. A related danger
arises when a financial market adopts an idea, method or innovation
purporting to streamline a process, or improve a matter of regulatory
concern, that becomes "branded" such that its recurrent use is considered
by stakeholders to be an authentic improvement. In financial market
regulation, this "branding" phenomenon is likely to be most parlous during
periods of rising asset prices and corporate profitability, when, to borrow
Robert Shiller's phrase, "social contagion" attenuates counterparty market
discipline 269 and regulators are eager to avoid conflict. There may even be
267. Id. at 455. Professor Lobel describes the "illusion of information and transparency"
as possessing two components: "[fqirst, it elides the tension between the desire of a society to
radically disperse decisionmaking" and the existence of qualified experts capable of making
meaningful decisions; and second, it adopts the misguided notion that the more information
that is disclosed and circulated, the higher the likelihood that stakeholders will converge on a
single position.
268. Similarly, Professors Dorf and Sabel warn against the danger that underperforming
entities might propose performance measures that "conceal more than they reveal," in order
to obstruct the proper functioning of an experimentalist benchmarking system. See Dorf &
Sabel, supra note 211, at 348.
269. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRIsIs HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 51-55 (2008) (discussing social
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psychological tendencies to develop unconscious biases that privilege
knowledge systems-such as those embedded in the new financial code-
that purport to normalize and assimilate events and data that are in fact
unexpected and unpredictable. 270 If the human mind abhors an authentic
encounter with uncertainty, we should be skeptical of crediting knowledge
systems that tend to minimize uncertainty. The legitimacy challenge
deepens further as financial regulators, believing markets to be self-
correcting or relying on limited information, allow product innovation to
proceed until a problem, along with the institutions involved in its
production, becomes "too big to fail." 27 While not forms of capture in a
strict sense, these risks can be thought of as a sort of soft, hegemonic
capture whereby agencies behave as if captured without any direct
expenditures by regulatees.
Nevertheless, as noted above, the New Deal-era formula of prescriptive
rules drafted ex ante and issued ex cathedra will likely be ineffective to achieve
stated regulatory objectives in a dynamic and complex market
environment. This is certainly true with respect to the complexity
paradigm of contemporary financial markets. We have seen above in Part
II.B how complex financial innovation resulting from technology,
globalization, and increased competition rendered the crude risk buckets of
the initial Basel Accord arbitrary nearly from the outset. Certain activities
have become too complex to be regulated or supervised by goal-pursuing
regulators, no matter how expert; they will almost always be behind the
curve. 272 Moreover, even if regulations could be drafted with requisite
precision, bureaucratic slippage in an environment with little margin for
error (because in complex systems, small differences often make worlds of
difference) would frustrate regulatory objectives. 27 3 As a result, it is to some
degree inevitable that those regulators charged with supervision of complex
contagion phenomenon in financial markets).
270. Simon, supra note 4, at 4-5.
271. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 1553, 1670 (2008) ("[A] financial regulator dealing
with a product 'too big to fail' will tend to behave in much the same way as it would if it had
been captured by the firms invested in the product. . . .").
272. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 216, at 542 ("[A]s society becomes more complex
and problems harder to solve, there is a need for more experimentation. Because
stakeholders often have the requisite knowledge [to solve problems], increased participation
becomes not only desirable, but also necessary.").
273. See, e.g., William R. Freudenburg & Robert Gramling, Bureaucratic Slippage and
Failures ofAgency Vigilance: The Case ofthe Environmental Studies Program, 41 Soc. PROB. 214, 214
(1994) (defining "bureaucratic slippage" as "the tendency for broad policies to be altered
through successive reinterpretation, such that the ultimate implementation may bear little
resemblance to legislated or other broad statements of policy intent.").
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regulatees operating in complex markets will turn to nonstate actors who
are actually "on the ground" to supplement their understanding of the
regulated market.27 4
The tripartite model of new governance can erect structural bulwarks
against the risk that a regulator is captured by a regulatee that has been
invited into a new governance process. The "social dialogue," HCP, and
reg-neg examples discussed above contemplate a tripartite model involving
some participation from third-party interest group organizations in addition
to regulators and regulatees.
Wisconsin's Green Tier environmental program provides another
example of a tripartite new governance structure. The Green Tier allows
qualifying firms to "opt out" of much of the command-and-control
framework, including the permitting process.275 A firm is eligible if it (1)
constructs and commits to an "environmental management system" (EMS)
self-regulatory regime that, in the estimation of state clean air and water
regulators, is functionally equivalent to an ISO-certified system276 and (2)
presents a plan that will ensure "superior environmental performance." 277
Green Tier firms are permitted to tailor their own solutions, embodied in
the EMS, to regulatory objectives, and enter into a "participation contract"
with the state environmental regulator that may specify certain derogations,
on a case-by-case basis, from the command-and-control regulatory
regime.278 The Green Tier program contemplates including third-party
interest group organizations directly in the regulatory contract negotiation
process (with appropriate rights of action against the regulatee) 279 and the
formation of the Green Tier advisory committee comprised of academics,
municipal government officials, and representatives from industry and
environmental groups. 280
274. While the focus of this Article is on contemporary financial complexity, complexity
is hardly a uniquely financial phenomenon. The factors impacting the complexity of
financial markets (e.g., globalization, competition, technology) underlie analogous processes
in other industries and cultural contexts.
275. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 216, at 558.
276. See Wis. STAT. § 299.83(l)(dg) (2009).
277. Id. § 299.83(5)(d). "Superior environmental performance" is defined as
"performance that results in measurable or discernible improvement in the quality of the air,
water, land, or natural resources, or in the protection of the environment, beyond that
which is achieved under [extant] environmental requirements." Id. § 299.83(l)(g).
278. Wis. STAT. § 299.83(6)0) ("The department shall ensure that the incentives
provided under a participation contract are proportional to the environmental benefits that
will be provided by the participant under the participation contract.").
279. Wis. STAT. § 299.83(1)(e).
280. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Green Tier Advisors,
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/cea/environmental/advisors/index.htm (last visited July 4,
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The involvement of third-party stakeholders such as public interest
groups to supervise and contribute to regulatory compliance enhances the
legitimacy and effectiveness of a broad participatory regime and minimizes
the risks of capture. 28 1 Provided they are adequately resourced and
deputized, these groups may improve governance in many other respects,
including (1) contributing more constitutively in a dialogic governance
process, rather than in a confrontational ex post litigation capacity;282 (2)
increasing the knowledge base on which policy is made by bridging
information gaps and providing additional perspectives to be considered; (3)
eliminating the risk of soft capture, whereby administrative agencies are
captured without any lobbying expenditures on the part of regulatees; 283
and (4) embedding in governance participation a counterweight to well-
organized constituencies that more effectively mobilize political support,
thereby enhancing policy from a republican standpoint as well. These
groups become part of an "interpretive community" that collectively
develop the content of regulation. 284
Such open participation of, and communication with, third-party
interest groups not only polices the regulator-regulatee relationship, it also
provides incentives for those groups' representatives to remain faithful to
the stated mission. In a regime characterized by confrontation and
litigation, these groups often resort to pursuing symbolic, rather than
tangible, rewards, especially when their constituency is diffuse and tangible
rewards are only obtained with great difficulty.285 When the stakes and
results of the regulatory process are open, it becomes more difficult to
justify symbolic victories to represented constituencies. It goes without
saying that not every group organized as "Citizens for X" is characterized
by unbending fealty to X. It is therefore important that the public agency
acts as a gatekeeper, inviting to the governance game only regulatees and
2010).
281. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 225, at 54-100 (elaborating a theory
of tripartite governance involving regulators, regulatees, and third-party public interest
groups).
282. See id. at 91-92 ("[F]ace-to-face negotiation will often transform confrontational
disputes into accommodative encounters where the concerns of the other are internalized.");
cf Dorf& Sabel, supra note 211, at 349 ("[T]here are some first signs that advocacy groups
are in fact realizing that they have more to gain by participating in decentralized problem
solving than by using strong-arm techniques to set limits on centralized decisions.").
283. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 225, at 79-80, 90.
284. BLACK, supra note 23, at 30-37.
285. See MURRAYJACOB EDELMAN, THE SYMBouc USES OF PoUncs 4, 22-43 (1985)
(explaining how unorganized political groups can provide "symbolic reassurance" to their
constituencies more reliably than tangible benefits for when aggregate political promises
diverge from actual possible allocations).
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authentically representative third-party interest group organizations*286
C. Internal Capital Models as Flawed New Governance
By studying the causes of regulatory reforms, we can understand their
objectives and assess their effectiveness as regulatory tools. In the case of
Basel II and the CSE Program, internal models were included in the capital
adequacy framework as a response to growing complexity that amplified
the mismatch between asset portfolios and the ex ante system of risk weights
embodied in the initial Basel Accord. Part II.B.3 described the integration
of internal market risk and credit risk models into the Basel II capital
adequacy regime as an attempted response to increased complexity in
banking institutions. In Part III, the adoption of the CSE Program for
large U.S. investment banks was explained in part as a similar response to
complexity. The internal models approaches to capital adequacy possess
attributes of new governance initiatives, especially power-sharing, enhanced
stakeholder participation, and flexible and dynamic lawmaking. They also
retain a benign big gun in the form of residual command-and-control
authority. However, as currently formulated, the utilization of internal
models in capital adequacy regulation fails to address adequately the
legitimacy challenges of new governance programs.
1. Enhanced Power-Sharing and Increased Participation, a Benign Big Gun, and
Dynamic and Flexible Lawmaking
Each internal models approach involves increased participation of and
power-sharing with regulatees. The capital charges for risks incurred are
set by reference to criteria generated by the firms themselves. In the case of
Basel II, the regulator provides the formula and the regulated banks furnish
their own internal estimates of the credit risk inputs, and permits banks to
calculate market risk and organizational risk on their own. Similarly, the
CSE Program, which measures market risk, permits banks to utilize their
own market risk calculations. Both Basel II and the CSE Program share
power and enhance governance participation vertically by harnessing the
information to which bank groups, but not regulators, have traditionally
had access in order to address a complex regulatory objective.287 The
286. This tripartite mode of governance is surely more natural to those familiar with the
European socio-legal order, with its rich history of social dialogue among institutions
representing wide spectra of workers and employers, which antedates the development of
the E.U. social dialogue governance discussed above by several decades.
287. See Cannata & Quagliarello, supra note 63, at 11 ("[S]ince the identification of the
adequate combination of capital and risk is not an easy task and financial markets and
products are increasingly complex, it is reasonable that any assessment starts up with the
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"Basel Brand" of regulation is also characterized by an emphasis on the
cross-learning that occurs as a result of enhanced regulator understanding
of how regulatees actually operate. In this respect, Basel II invites
comparison with cross-learning resulting from stock investments from
capital-rich developing jurisdictions in sophisticated and complex financial
institutions in capital-importingjurisdictions. 288
In addition, the internal models approach introduces significant
flexibility into the capital adequacy regime by aligning the capital charges
in a more risk-sensitive manner with the dynamic asset portfolios of
contemporary financial institutions. The models are plastic and may be
adjusted to reflect market experience or results of model backtesting. The
SEC hailed the CSE Program for its ability to "monitor for and act quickly in
response to financial or operational weakness in a CSE holding company or
its unregulated affiliates that might place regulated entities, including U.S.
and foreign registered banks and broker dealers or the broader financial
system at risk."289 For a firm operating under Basel II's IR-B approach, lead
risk managers at the firm will be able to adjust the model assumptions
directly through channels of corporate authority, rather than wait for a
cumbersome notice-and-comment rulemaking or similar proceeding at the
administrative level. Under Basel II, regulators are more concerned with
process of model updating than the substantive details of any particular
model. For instance, banking groups using the IRB approach must ensure
that their models' inputs are used in the business operating units, and that
results of backtesting models are incorporated into the models. As a
process-oriented reform, the internal models approach recalls Lester
Salamon's observation that new governance initiatives reconceptualize
regulators as procedural arrangers seeking to achieve regulatory objectives.
Each reform also adopts, to varying degrees, a benign big gun approach.
The Basel Committee only permits firms to utilize internal models to set
their capital adequacy requirements if they meet, both initially and on an
ongoing basis, certain qualitative and quantitative criteria. Moreover, bank
evaluation made by the intermediaries themselves.").
288. Cf Katharina Pistor, Banking Reforn in the Chinese Mirror 13-14, (Colum. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 354, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1446930 ("[B]ehavioral change is more likely to be achieved by
engaging individual actors in the process of change rather than confronting them with new
policy guidelines enshrined in formal law-in the development of which they did not take
part.").
289. The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Heaing on H.. 698 Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 15 (2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts042507rc.htm (statement of Robert Colby,
Deputy Dir., Market Regulation, SEC) (emphasis added).
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regulators provide Basel II's credit risk formulae, which neatly circumscribe
the authority of regulatee banks to set their own credit risk capital charges.
Required backtesting for market risk VaR models with step-ups in capital
charges for underperforming models similarly ensures a continuing
regulator presence. In certain respects, the CSE Program, while increasing
regulatee participation and power-sharing, also ramped up regulator
involvement in U.S. investment banks by, for example, submitting them to
consolidated supervision and requiring consent to SEC examination of all
affiliates, regular reporting requirements to SEC, and mandatory provision
of reports filed by affiliates subject to inspection by other regulators.
Overall, though, the SEC's authority and resources to police the new
governance aspects of the CSE Program proved disastrously inadequate. 290
Due to its abdication of effective enforcement, the CSE Program straddles
the line between new governance and deregulation.
In summary, the internal models approach in theory holds potential for
finally bridging the information gaps that impede regulatory understanding
of firms' risk profiles. It also might foster a more collaborative relation
between regulators and regulatee firms, and minimize the tendency for
firms to resort to capital arbitrage.2 91
2. Internal Models and Normative Challenges to Legitimacy
The limitations of using statistical models from the new financial code as
tools to measure risk are manifold and well-documented, 292 but their main
inherent limitation is their inability to locate an ex ante data set from which
reliable conclusions may be drawn as to the probability and impact of
future events, particularly large impact events.293  In other words, a
predictive statistical model is necessarily self-referential, so it is incapable of
supporting inferences with respect to future "fat-tail" phenomena, certain
290. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 187, at 741-44 (pointing out that the SEC assigned
only three staff to each CSE firm and that the SEC technically lacked the basic authority to
order a firm to increase its debt-to-equity ratio).
291. See supra notes 20 and 23 and accompanying text.
292. Note that VaR-type models pose additional challenges unrelated to their accuracy
as risk measurement tools, such as the so-called VaR negative feedback loop, which occurs
when declines in an asset's price cause firms utilizing modeling technologies to sell off that
asset, exacerbating the downward pressure on the asset price as all firms attempt to sell.
293. See, e.g., Nassim N. Taleb, Common Errors in Interpreting the Ideas ofThe Black Swan and
Associated Papers, N.Y.U. POLY LNSTITUTE (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1490769 (bemoaning what Taleb
calls the "ludic fallacy": namely, that statistical models assume a probability structure similar
to closed games with a priori known probability when they often lack sufficient data from
which to construct a probability distribution in the first place).
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of which may lack any historical precedent data at all. 294 The importation
of statistical "certainty" into complex phenomenon like contemporary
financial markets is especially problematic. Some have suggested that
induction, and even cause-and-effect relationships, are unintelligible in
certain complex environments characterized by circularity, self-
referentiality, and unpredictability. 295 Asset and credit markets, in short,
are not like coin flips. 296
Moreover, all VaR models have mechanical limitations. Consider as an
example the MRA internal models approach, which permits banks to use
VaR models based on whatever simulations they prefer. 297 Banks may
choose among so-called historical simulation, Monte Carlo simulation, and
variance-covariance techniques to measure VaR.298 A key assumption of
the variance-covariance technique is a normal distribution of financial
market returns, which is not only empirically false, 299 but false with respect
to arguably the primary justificatory purpose of the capital charge: namely,
to ensure that banks had a capital buffer to withstand low-probability
adverse developments (including, most importantly, non-normally
distributed fat tail events). Though historical simulations have the
advantage of avoiding the assumption of a normal distribution of returns,
two significant problems exist with their use: first, accuracy is a function of
the sampling period; and second, limiting inputs to historical data
necessarily assumes that future extreme return distributions will not exceed
294. Cf RIccARDo REBONATO, PLIGHT OF THE FORTUNE TELLERS: WHY WE NEED TO
MANAGE FINANcIAL RISK DIFFERENTLY 252 (2007) (questioning utility of a 99.9 percentile
confidence interval for one-year loss because of a lack of sufficient data points for 1000-year
events from which patterns might be drawn); Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human
Frailty, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing "Knightian uncertainty [as] a breeding ground for
pathologies in decision making and human conduct").
295. Taleb, supra note 293, at 5-6. A similar point is made with respect to the
impossibility of actuarially pricing risks for purposes of setting risk-based deposit insurance
premiums: "The risks of an 'extreme' event, in the form of a banking crisis resulting in
massive losses to a deposit insurance fund, defy the sort of probabilistic quantification based
on experience that insurers conduct to anticipate losses from insured events. In the face of
this uncertainty, an insurer cannot calculate the resources it may need and thus cannot price
efficiently." TARULLO, supra note 14, at 26.
296. See Emanuel Derman, Models, 65 FIN. ANALYSTSJ. 28, 32 (2009).
297. 1996 MARKET RISK AMENDMENTS, supra note 146, at 44.
298. Id.
299. See GOODHART ET AL., supra note 15, at 80 ("It is now well known that financial
market returns are only imperfectly described by the normal distribution. In particular, the
empirically observed frequency distributions have fat tails, i.e. large market movements
occur more often than predicted by the normal [distribution]."); Shahin Shojai & George
Feiger, Economists' Hubris-The Case of Risk Management, 28J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 27, 32
(2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 1550622.
858 [62:3
2010] LNTERAIL MODELSAPPROACH TO CAPITAL ADEQUACYREGULATION
historical extremes.300
Using internal models for regulatory capital adequacy purposes poses
incentive-related problems as well. In the years leading up to the subprime
credit crisis, most firms' internal models had not addressed the possibility
that house prices might decline.30 This methodological error might not be
casual; it is precisely the method one might expect a bank, cognizant of the
safety net it enjoys, to take.30 2 The bank's model allows the bank to
participate fully in the rising tide of financial profits. This recalls Professor
Steven Schwarcz's discussion of systemic risk as a tragedy of the commons
problem: because the benefits of exploiting finite capital allocations accrue
disproportionately to financiers performing the allocation and the costs fall
onto the broader class of users of finance, financiers lack sufficient
incentives to internalize the externalities and their misjudgment of risk
might cost the real economy in the long run.303 To adapt the infamous
phrase of former Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince, "If the music is still
playing, the capital model will be made to dance." Finally, this point on
the incentive structure of banks applies on an intra-firm basis as well: profit
center units have little interest in accurate risk profiling of activities that are
likely to yield greater compensation. 304
300. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 15, at 82. On the other hand, adopting a longer-
term observation period would include more data observation points, but would be
unavailable for certain standard risk factors (if the risk factor has developed recently) and
increase the likelihood that a return distribution has changed in recent periods, which could
lead to biased VaR estimates. See id. at 79.
301. See, e.g, Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquio Commission Hearitg on the Financial
Crisis (2010) (statement ofJ. Kyle Bass, Managing Partner, Hayman Advisors, L.P.), available
at http://www.cspan.org/Watch/Media/2010/01/13/HP/A/28382/Financial+Crisis+
Inquiry+Commission+ +Day+One.aspx.
302. Note that one need not maintain that banks were engaging consciously in
fraudulent, "heads I win, tails you lose" behavior vis-a-vis taxpayers to ascribe to this theory.
There may be a psychological bias in favor of unrealistic modeling assumptions. See supra
note 270 and accompanying text. Credit rating agencies played an important role in the
subprime credit crisis by providing a veneer of credibility to the models' predictions. Even
the Federal Reserve, as late as 2006, claimed that, notwithstanding historical price trends,
the housing bubble was not worrisome because housing prices always tracked income
growth (despite the fact that mortgage loan growth, which inevitably flowed through to
housing prices, doubled that of GDP growth). See Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiy
Commission Hearing on the Financial Crisis, slide 3 (2010) (statement of Michael Mayo, Managing
Director, Caylon Securities), available at http://www.cspan.org/Watch/Media/2010/01/
13/HP/A/28382/Financial+Crisis+Inquiry+Commission++Day+One.aspx (documenting
8%-21% loan growth in all real estate sub-sectors and 4.5% GDP growth, in each case
during the 2000s).
303. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008).
304. Cf TARULLO, supra note 14, at 101 ("The various bank divisions had little interest
in promoting clear and well-developed risk profiles of their activities, since this might mean
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For present purposes, it suffices to note that the inherent limitations of
modeling technologies are present in all their uses, and the high-impact
events against which we should guard most cautiously will almost never be
susceptible to financial modeling. It is therefore imperative that any
regulatory use of internal models is undertaken with full knowledge of these
inherent limitations and a healthy dose of skepticism.
Notwithstanding the positive new governance attributes discussed above
in Part V.C. 1, the extant regulatory structures within which internal models
are put to use present normative challenges typical of new governance
reforms that accentuate the models' inherent limitations. The retention of
a benign big gun attenuates the immediate danger of outsourcing an
important policy objective to largely self-interested regulatees. However,
relying on effective supervision of internal models' adequacy opens up
possibilities of literal or soft capture, especially with respect to bank
regulators (like those in the United States) that are funded by assessments
and fees from their regulatees.30 5 The adoption of a new governance
technique in response to financial complexity raises challenges to legitimacy
and effectiveness, particularly with the forms of soft capture discussed above
in Part V.C. As discussed above in Part II.B.3.i, that very complexity was
facilitated by sophisticated technological code that is treated in Basel II and
the CSE Program as the solution to the complexity problem.
Regulators resorted to internal models because there was no competing
method to bridge the information asymmetry between banks and
regulators. Banks tightly guard their propriety risk models, which
constitute a significant store of value for risk-intermediating financial
institutions. When a single group of stakeholders offers to bridge a wide
information deficit through introduction of a new governance technology
relying on proprietary information or methods, the challenge to effective
policymaking and democratic legitimacy is acute. Recalling Lobel's
warning against the "illusion of information" (i.e., that privileged access to
more constraints on the very activities that-at least in the short term-were most likely to
yields the highest profits."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REv. 211, 224-25 (2009) (describing how risk management personnel had
incentives to allocate assets to achieve low VaR estimates, notwithstanding the gradual
build-up of massive fat tail risk that was not taken into account in the VaR model). In this
context, it is also noteworthy that though most large financial groups had risk committees on
their boards of directors, outside audits of risk management function (as opposed to the
financial statements and internal controls functions) is not required. See Fanto, supra note 73,
at 744-45.
305. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to
the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
20, 23 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth,Jr. eds., forthcoming 2010).
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and processing of information, especially economic information, can
compromise new governance initiatives), the resort to internal risk models
raises this unique danger of regulatee-controlled economic information in
the form of the new financial code.306 The danger is that this information
will foster an unjustified perception of safety and soundness due to its
putative quantifiability. When David Li, a J.P. Morgan researcher,
published a paper in 2000 using a statistical technique known as the
Gaussian copula model to measure default correlation among corporate
bonds underlying a CDO, he dramatically enhanced bankers' confidence in
their ability to quantify the risks associated with each CDO tranche.307 As
bankers relied more and more on Li's method, they unwittingly created a
new systemic correlation risk: if the model contained a faulty assumption,
the effects of the error would be amplified considerably because all market
participants would suffer losses. Li himself said of his model: "The most
dangerous part is when people believe everything coming out of it."308
Moreover, the SEC's uncritical adoption of the Basel Brand in the CSE
Program further compromises the legitimacy of resorting to internal models
to calculate capital requirements, inasmuch as regulators proved to suffer
from the same social contagion as market participants, perhaps stoked by
biases that encouraged the use of internal models that purported to
minimize uncertainty. 309  Even where inherently skeptical regulators
attempt further inquiry into a model's assumptions, a desire to avoid
conflict will frequently inhibit effective supervision when the political cost of
dissenting from the Basel Brand is high, as occurs during periods of rising
asset prices, returns, and risks. The discussion in Part II.B.3.i.b regarding
regulators' largely uncritical embrace of banks' ability to understand risk
exemplifies the social contagion problem.
Finally, as noted above in Part V.C, financial technologies are vulnerable
to "too big to fail" dynamics where regulators behave as though they have
been captured. First, the rapid proliferation of internal models created a
path dependency in that they became too important to bank
competitiveness and to look to any other risk gauge could constitute a
disruption of bank business that could pose systemic risks. The models
themselves had become "too big to fail" and no other method of bridging
the information asymmetries was feasible. Second, on an ongoing basis, the
procyclicality of using VaR models to compute capital requirements
306. See Lobel, supra note 221, at 455.
307. GILLIAN TETr, FOOL'S GOLD: How UNRESTRAINED GREED CORRUPTED A
DREAM, SHATrERED GLOBAL MARKETS AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 120-21 (2009).
308. Id. at 122.
309. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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heightens the regulatory stakes: if regulators or other stakeholders do not
recognize mismatches between modeled risk and actual risk at an early
stage, regulators might be tempted to "forbear" prompt corrective action
until the next administration so as to forestall a painful contraction of credit
(in the process exacerbating its inevitable effects).310
While no comprehensive empirical study has been conducted to date, it
is safe to say these problems are not merely theoretical. In the years leading
up to the recent subprime credit crunch, large international commercial
banking groups had, for the most part, not transitioned fully to an internal
model approach for capital adequacy purposes, though U.S.-based
investment banks were subject to the CSE Program. U.S. commercial bank
regulators adopted the IRB approaches in December 2007, but the final
rule provided for: (1) a minimum sixty-day period of review of a bank's
implementation plan; (2) a four-quarter "parallel run" period, during which
a bank was required to comply with all of the IRB prerequisite criteria; and
(3) a minimum of three four-quarter "transitional floor" periods before
which a bank could transition to a "stand alone" IRB approach. 311 The
earliest a U.S. banking group can fully transition to the IRB, then, is April
2012. U.S. commercial banks-but not investment banks-were, however,
operating under 3%-4% leverage ratio constraints under FDICIA.
European banks were subject to Basel II effective January 2008, well after
the credit crisis was a foregone conclusion. Since Basel II was not in effect
in the U.S. commercial banking sector, it can hardly be blamed for the
capital collapse during the subprime credit crunch. However, the losses
suffered by the industry lay some blame on the modeling technologies on
which Basel II is based, inasmuch as they failed to understand the risks
involved.3 12
In 2006, Tim Geithner, then-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, ordered a review of how well large banks measured their ability
to withstand a severe market downturn; the results were not encouraging,
as firms were failing to account for worst-case scenarios in their models.3 13
310. Forbearance by regulators during the late 1980s contributed to the thrift debacle of
the early 1990s. See William K. Black, Why Is Geithner Continuing Paulson's Policy of Violating the
Law?, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-
black/why-is-geithner-continuin b_169234.html ("[FDICIA]'s premise was that regulatory
discretion led to cover-ups of failed banks and excessive losses to the taxpayers.").
311. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-Basel II,
72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,300-01 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325).
312. At present, the models are not publicly disclosed, so it is impossible to individuate
with precision the models' effects.
313. Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Jeff Gerth, As Crisis homed, Geithner Pressed But Fell Short,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2009, at Al.
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In 2005, Swiss bank UBS had already transitioned to Basel II when it
decided to pursue aggressively the mortgage securitization business. 314
UBS's risk management department utilized a model that assumed that the
so-called "super senior" risk that UBS retained on its balance sheet in
securitization transactions could only lose 2% of its value. 315 Its Basel II
capital requirements plunged and UBS piled on its super senior exposure.
By 2007, it had $50 billion in exposure; 316 not coincidentally, within two
years UBS had booked about $50 billion in asset write downs and was
shored up only by a series of private and public capital infusions.3 17 As
Rodge Cohen of Sullivan & Cromwell put it, describing his eleventh-hour
sessions with the Federal Reserve and bank executives during the week AIG
was nationalized and Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 protection: "If
there is a single factor which is the principal source of what has happened,
it is the absence of knowledge of how much risk is in the system, and where
it was. I think those who were optimistic simply did not realize how much
risk was there."3 18 This conclusion implicitly supports the prescription that
if regulators are to continue to use internal models in capital adequacy
regulation, the current regulatory approaches require modification.
3. Pillar 3's Mandatory Disclosure as an Incomplete Tripartite Governance Response
to Legitimacy Challenges
Pillar 3 of Basel 1I attempts to address soft and direct capture concerns
by fostering "market discipline" through disclosure requirements. 3 19 Public
disclosure transmits information concerning capital positions, risk
exposures, and internal models to capital markets participants, other
counterparties, and rating agencies, and therefore affects the access to and
price of debt and equity capital as well as deposits/premiums. If recipients
of the information possess the requisite sophistication to process and
understand it, the capital markets can impose discipline on disclosing banks
by increasing the cost of capital for, or diverting business from, firms that
are perceived to be engaging in riskier activities.3 20 In this way, market
314. TETT, supra note 307, at 161-63.
315. Id. at 162.
316. Id. at 242.
317. Goran Miijuk, PrescnPtion for UBS: Hard Work, WALL ST.J., Sept. 2, 2009, at C2.
318. FT.com, View from the Top, "Interview with Rodgin Cohen," 2:10-2:50,
http://www.ft.com/cms/8a38c684-2a26-1 Ildc-9208-000b5dfl0621.html (last viewed Apr.
14,2010).
319. The CSE Program did not require any public disclosure relating to internal models
and therefore did not address the tension at all.
320. Cf BANKING CRISES, supra note 13, at 11-13 (explaining how market participants
can create market information sources that complement banking supervision by increasing
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responses to banks' uses of internal models would contribute to what
Robert Shiller has referred to as a "new information infrastructure"
aspiring to "alter [ the social contagion and information cascades that
underlie the formation of speculative bubbles." 32 1 In particular, mandatory
disclosure concerning the assumptions, mechanics, and backtesting results
of internal models would subject the models themselves to outside
scrutiny.322 Provided the disclosure is meaningful, third-party organizations
representing stakeholder constituencies affected by allocations of risk capital
(e.g., depositors, capital markets investors, consumer credit customers,
mortgage loan recipients) could subject the internal models to their own
scenarios and tests, altering assumptions where necessary, in order to gauge
institution-level risks. Moreover, because these interest groups represent
wide arrays of actors, they are well positioned to examine the aggregate
assumptions of bank industry capital modeling practices to test for
correlations that could pose systemic risks. That is, to the extent that banks
and regulators as a group are failing to focus on a particular distributive
contingency-because, for example, banks enjoy limited liability and
regulators have been captured-an unaffiliated interest group particularly
affected by the contingency could test and publish a model assuming an
adverse course of events. Such an approach should foster both legitimacy
and also the quality of the models. 323 Third-party surveillance of the
internal models represents an attractive tripartite governance solution in
which regulators, regulatees, and affected third-party stakeholders
collaborate.
A tripartite regime based on mandatory disclosure leaves unresolved the
problem of what to do with the disclosed information. Interest groups can
run and publish their own tests, modifying assumptions and data sets, but
unless they have standing to object to the internal models used by banks,
such a regime will rely on regulator suasion. If nothing else, a bevy of ever-
skeptical third-party interest groups will raise the stake (the "price") of
regulatory capture or forbearance: it will be harder to capture or deceive
information flows to regulators as well as the costs of forbearance, and could even serve as
triggers for regulatory intervention).
321. SHILLER, supra note 269, at 121.
322. A mandatory disclosure regime should also disrupt intra-firm politics by shifting
power away from senior executives and towards risk management personnel, the sole firm
constituency with the operational expertise to fulfill the firm function now subject to
disclosure. Cf Sabel & Simon, supra note 234, at 1078-79 (explaining how a liability
determination in a case against a public agency, by mandating enhanced transparency,
tends to decentralize power within the agency and empower "lower tier workers" who
receive "increased discretion to cope with contingencies with which they are most familiar").
323. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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bank regulators that, in possession of alternative scenario tests, are
adequately informed and subject to scrutiny. In most cases, though, the
represented third-party interest will be widely dispersed, so it is not
reasonable to expect that such interest groups will marshal their resources
as effectively as regulated financial institutions to engage regulators in a
debate about internal models. Interest groups could be formally deputized
with some form of administrative standing to challenge a model's
assumptions, or institutionally resourced with public financial support.
Credit rating agencies, which have extensive modeling experience and have
even begun to incorporate consideration of internal capital models into
their financial strength ratings, could be enlisted to review capital models. 324
Provided the banking groups themselves are not funding the rating
agencies, the familiar rating agency conflicts of interest would not be
expected to hamstring such a system. Alternatively, interest group
participation could be formalized by a thirty-day comment period during
which groups could submit comments or modifications to a bank's internal
models.325 The bank's regulator would then be required to explain publicly
why it did or did not adopt the proposed revisions to the bank's regulatory
capital requirement. In this way, capital adequacy regulation would
borrow tripartite new governance features from, e.g., reg-neg and the
Green Tier Program.
Though Pillar 3's emphasis on disclosure of internal models is a welcome
addition to the bank regulatory toolkit, its requirements are at present too
limited to foster an authentic tripartism that can credibly protect the capital
adequacy regime against legitimacy challenges. As mentioned above,
under Pillar 3 banks provide general descriptions of the market risk and
operational risk models, and more particularized information concerning
the "definitions, methods, data, and assumptions" used in the credit risk
324. Large internationally active bank competitors domiciled in foreign jurisdictions
(and their regulators), too, would have incentives to monitor the use of internal models to
ensure their local industries are not competitively disadvantaged by lax enforcement in other
jurisdictions. While monitoring from other jurisdictions might improve the quality of global
banking regulation, it would not necessarily conduce to the public objectives of a particular
jurisdiction's bank regulatory apparatus, which is concerned with the safety and soundness
of the domestic institutions. In recognition of these cross-jurisdictional conflicts of interest,
the Basel Committee has established Accord Implementation Group and a Capital
Interpretation Group to foster uniformity in the implementation and interpretation of Basel
II. Notwithstanding the domestic focus of regulation, foreign banks and regulators would be
expected to contribute to the discussion, and raise the international political costs of
domestic regulators endorsing flawed models.
325. Cf Dorf & Sabel, supra note 211, at 349 (proposing that "authorizing legislation
would confer on aggrieved citizen users a statutory right to participat[e]" in administrative
processes resulting in benchmarking and standard setting).
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models, subject to the qualification that Pillar 3 "does not require a detailed
description of the model in full-it should provide the reader with a broad
overview of the model approach, describing definitions of the variables, and
methods for estimating and validating" the model inputs.326 This exception
threatens to swallow Pillar 3's general disclosure rules, as it provides banks
with a justification to avoid disclosure of sensitive proprietary information.
Pillar 3's fatal flaw as a tripartite new governance tool is its overemphasis
on the proprietary aspect of the models and an underemphasis on their
informational aspect.
The current disclosure requirements did not come without protestations
from banks, which lamented the required disclosure of confidential and
proprietary information.3 27 The Basel Committee recognized that any
disclosure regime must balance the benefits of increased disclosure against
the utility created by protecting proprietary information. According to the
Committee, this information, if shared with competitors, "would render a
bank's investment in these products/systems less valuable, and hence would
undermine its competitive position." 328 We have seen earlier how banks'
VaR and other modeling technologies did not merely facilitate the business
of banking; they had become part and parcel of the business of banking,
and comprised a key competitive asset and repository of value for banking
groups.32 9 The same is true with the internal models used in setting
regulatory capital requirements, which borrowed technology directly from
firms' VaR models. In particular, mandatory disclosure of proprietary
models estimating credit risks strikes at the basic value proposition of banks:
their effective intermediation between savings and investment. The
introduction of widespread statistical modeling (and, as a result,
securitization) in the banking business has shifted the focus of credit
intermediation from qualitative on-the-ground assessment of debtors'
likelihood-of-repayment to behavioral and economic predictions based on
326. BASEL II DOCUMENT, supra note 162, at 235 n.207; cf Agency Information
Collection Activities; Submission for OMB Review; Joint Comment Request, 73 Fed. Reg.
4222 (Jan. 24, 2008) (stating that "certain summary information would be made available to the
public for reporting periods after a bank has qualified to use the advanced approaches for
regulatory capital to provide a sufficient degree of public disclosure to market participants")
(emphasis added).
327. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-Basel
II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,336 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325) (noting that
some commentators objected because the disclosure requirement would place them at a
disadvantage against foreign competitors); cf BASEL II DOCUMENT supra note 162, at 228
(stating that sharing proprietary information would seriously affect the value of banks'
products/systems).
328. BASEL II DOCUMENT, supra note 162, at 228.
329. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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aggregated pools of debtor data. Statistical models are, in short, what banks
do anymore. It might be possible to accommodate bank concerns about
proprietary interests by embedding modeling software into interactive
disclosure interfaces, which would permit other parties to adjust
assumptions and parameters to determine the outputs a model would yield.
Regulators could require the use of eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL) to present interactive data, much like the SEC currently
does for some reporting companies, mutual funds, and rating agencies.
The challenge would be to design a compromise XBRL-type disclosure
system that neither permits third-parties to deduce proprietary models nor
lacks information required to assess a model's performance.
It is at least partially true that mandatory disclosure of risk models will
erode competitive position of disclosing banks vis-t-vis two sets of
competitors. First, while large U.S. banks are required to adopt Basel II's
IRB approach, other jurisdictions offer IRB as an option. As such,
mandatory internal model disclosure could impose a regulatory tax on
U.S.-based banks. Second, the IRB approach is designed, in all
jurisdictions, to apply to large internationally active banks. Accordingly, a
free-rider problem might arise as smaller banks adopt modeling
technologies developed by larger competitors subject to IRB. A different
but related danger arises if large internationally active banks from non-U.S.
jurisdictions eschew a disclosure-enhanced Basel II altogether, resulting in
social loss through frustration of IRB's new governance attributes.
Notwithstanding these potential costs of enhanced disclosure, the
legitimacy challenge, discussed above, poses its own substantial economic
costs and democratic deficits. I propose a new emphasis on tripartism
through fuller disclosure, on the grounds that third-party interest groups
representing other constituencies will (1) discipline banks by subjecting their
internal models to enhanced scrutiny, thereby attenuating risks of literal
and soft capture, and (2) experiment with new modeling assumptions,
techniques, data sources and scenarios to improve the accuracy of the
models.
CONCLUSION
New governance theory provides an analytical framework to assess
financial regulatory reform initiatives designed to regulate and manage the
complex and dynamic networks of risks in which financial institutions put
our surplus capital to work. New governance is always oriented around the
problem of complexity; it sees in it a source of opportunity, but also danger.
It shines light on normative challenges to the legitimacy of efforts to involve
regulatees and third-parties more directly in public regulation of
complexity, such as heightened risks of literal and soft capture. This Article
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poses as a complexity problem the structural dilemma of capital adequacy
regulation resulting from the disjoint between its traditional prescriptive
risk-weighting approach and the actual risks financial institutions face.
Capital adequacy is not unique in this respect; the complexity paradigm of
contemporary finance is characterized by widening information
asymmetries between regulators and regulatees generally. In the face of
dizzying complexity, the tools and methodologies of traditional regulation
begin to appear arbitrary. I argue that a new governance perspective
addresses this structural dilemma of financial regulation as a problem of
regulatory technology: that is, how to harness new modes of interaction
between public and nonstate actors without calling into question the
legitimacy of public administrative goals?
Like most technologies, new governance tools often have unintended
consequences. Basel II's internal models approach, which privileges
proprietary interests in new financial code (i.e., the internal models) over an
open discussion over the models as tools of public governance, is a case
study in the tendency of soft capture to compromise a new governance
initiative. In the rush to harness the socially productive financial code, the
internal models approach embraces the illusion of information efficiency
embodied in the Basel Brand. Future new governance inquiries into
financial regulatory reform must focus on soft capture and safeguard
against the possibility that, like the internal models approach, in the rush to
bridge information asymmetries we adopt a reform that creates more
problems than it solves.
Because new governance theory sees complexity as both a source of
opportunities and dangers, new governance financial regulatory scholarship
should always remain critical of complexity itself.330 When regulating
complex financial systems, the alternative is never between arbitrary
regulation on the one hand and deregulation, "voluntary self-regulation,"
or flawed new governance on the other. Regulators and policymakers need
to consider a third alternative: using command-and-control techniques
(e.g., maximum LTV ratios, bans on trading activities, central clearing and
collateral posting for derivatives) to shape the regulated market dynamics so
that regulation is not rendered arbitrary from the outset by rapid and
volatile market changes. Depending on the nature of the market's
complexity and the soft capture threats posed by new governance
techniques, in many cases public objectives (e.g., credit formation with an
acceptable risk tolerance) will be more effectively achieved by ramping back
complexity itself. In this respect, new governance-as applied to financial
regulation-resonates with skeptics of neoclassical economic explanations
330. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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of complexity as an instrumental phenomenon in pursuit of capital
arbitrage or customer demands. In the real world, complexity entails
significant costs, particularly for the "greater fool," whether an investor or a
regulator, on the wrong end of the information asymmetry.33 '
331. Cf JOSEPH STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICAN, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 91 (2010).
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